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SEALING PANDORA'S BOX: JUDICIAL DOCTRINES 
RESTRICTING PUBLIC TRUST CITIZEN 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS 
David P. Gionfriddo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The early 1970's were important years for the development of 
American environmental law. On the federal level, heightened con-
cern for environmental issues led to the passage of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),l the cornerstone of our 
federal resource protection legislation. NEPA signalled a new na-
tional commitment to environmental protection, and a new willing-
ness on the part of government to assume a forceful role in preserv-
ing the country's natural resource trust. 2 This pervasive concern was 
• Production Editor, 1985-1986, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
142 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). For a comprehensive overview of NEPA and its evolution 
in the courts, see D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (1984). 
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1982). At a November, 1970 conference on environmental law, 
Professor Joseph Sax, author of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act's first draft, 
commented on the implications of NEPA: 
[Ilt is in conception one of the most important environmental laws on the books of 
the federal government, for it reflects a sense in the Congress that the time has come 
to stop and reflect on where the traditional production-consumption enterprise that 
dominated our resource policies has carried us; that it is time to open for equal 
consideration the cultural approach which views consumption and demand as malle-
able factors which should be made responsive to the carrying capacities of the natural 
system in which they arise .... 
A statute which sets out a mandate to "fill the responsibilities of each generation 
as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations," ... reflects, I think, a 
sense within the Congress that something more is required than the beautification 
of power sites with plantings of flowers, or painting of buildings to blend in with the 
surroundings. 
It is a call for unconventional approaches, for reappraisal of traditional ways of 
operating, for taking some substantial time and energy to seek out alternatives which 
were not even thought relevant before .... 
The National Environmental Policy Act reflects a yearning in the Congress for 
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felt at the state level as well, and a number of states passed their 
own environmental statutes. 3 
These state laws took a variety of different forms. Some statutes 
contained strong declarations of environmental policy, but left all 
enforcement authority with state agencies. 4 Others gave citizens 
standing to challenge environmentally hazardous activities indirectly 
by suing the state for its failure to prosecute polluters.5 Citizens 
were empowered, under still other laws, to sue private polluters for 
violations of existing state laws or regulations. 6 The most innovative 
type of law, however, gave citizens a much wider grant of standing 
under a new cause of action modelled on the venerable common law 
principles of public trust. 7 
For example, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 
(MEPA),8 the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act of 1971 
(MERA),9 and the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971 
(CEPA),1O grant to any private party the authority to sue virtually 
any actor, public or private, to enjoin conduct that substantially 
harms the state's natural resourcesY No minimum number of plain-
new ideas about environmental control. It reflects, I would say, a mandate to recon-
sider the old idea that the existing state of the art is to be taken as a clear defense 
in any challenge to polluting conduct. It reflects a desire to promote innovation, to 
encourage, to put demands upon the enormous skills and ingenuity of industry -
rather than to accept a static situation as wholly given, a position which has in itself 
perpetuated the lack of incentives to innovate. 
Sax, New Direction in the Law: Breaks in the Legal Logjam, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12-
13 (C. Hasset ed. 1971). 
3 For a complete summary of state environmental protection acts and their relevant provi-
sions, see Dimento, Asking God to Solve Our Problems for Us: Citizen Environmental Suit 
Legislation in the Western States, 2 V.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y. 169, 174-75 (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as Dimento, Western States]. 
4 See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12,600-12,612, 12,607 (West 1980). 
5 See Maryland Environmental Standing Act of 1978, MD. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 1-501 to 1-
508, 1-503(b) (Michie 1983). 
6 See Florida Environmental Protection Act of 1971, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 
1973). For more on the variations among state environmental citizen suit laws, see Dimento, 
Western States, supra note 3, at notes 4-10 and accompanying text; Dimento, Citizen Envi-
ronmental Litigation and the Administrative Process: Empirical Findings, Remaining Is-
sues, and a Direction for Future Research, 1977 DUKE L.J. 409, 4lO [hereinafter cited as 
Dimento, Administrative Process]. 
7 A lengthy account of the common law public trust's history and development is beyond 
the scope of this Comment. For a comprehensive overview of the doctrine, see H. ALTHAUS, 
PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS (1978). 
8 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.528(201)-(207) (Callaghan 1980); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§§ 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1984). Subsequent citations will be to Michigan Statutes An-
notated only. 
9 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.Ol-.13 (West 1977). 
10 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to 22a-20 (West 1985). 
11 MERA does not authorize suits brought against a landowner for acts taken on his own 
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tiffs is required to bring suit,12 and no violation of any other appli-
cable state law need be proven. Each of these laws establishes a 
substantive framework to determine the legality of environmentally 
harmful conduct. Each citizen becomes a beneficiary of the public 
trust inherent in the state's resource pool; the obligation of the 
"trustee" to protect those resources reaches beyond the state to 
include all private citizens. 13 In essence, these statutes create a 
land, or against a lessee acting pursuant to a valid permit from the landowner, when the 
challenged acts do not and can not reasonably be expected to impair any other MERA 
resources within the state. Also, any activity conducted pursuant to a valid environmental 
quality standard, regulation, rule, license, or similar order cannot be the subject of a citizen 
suit under MERA. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03, subd. 1 (1977). Thus, MERA does not 
give state courts the type of administrative oversight functions envisioned by MEPA's draf-
ters, see infra note 24. The Michigan legislature rejected a proposed MEPA amendment that 
would have exempted from MEPA suits parties acting pursuant to validly-issued state envi-
ronmental permits, licenses, or agreements. Haynes, Michigan's Environmental Protection 
Act in Its Sixth Year: Substantive Environmental Law From Citizen Suits, 53 J. URB. LAW 
589, 666-68 (1976). 
12 Compare these statutes with the environmental citizen suit provision of Massachusetts, 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A (West Supp. 1986). The Massachusetts statute requires 
that a citizen suit be brought by "not less than ten persons domiciled within the common-
wealth." Id. 
13 The concept that natural resources are a "commons" to be shared by all people has 
frequently appeared in scholarly writings, state constitutions, and even judicial opinions. 
One state court has hinted that the common law public trust can create enforceable legal 
rights in the entirety of a state's natural resources. See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana 
Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. Sup. Ct. 1984). 
The common ownership concept also has been discussed frequently by scholars in law, 
science and economics. See, e.g., Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
(1968); E. F. MURPHY, NATURE, BUREAUCRACY AND THE RULES OF PROPERTY (1977). 
Economists and legal commentators have used the notion of common property to buttress 
some interesting proposals for new environmental protection strategies. One such group of 
proposals, differing from MEPA's injunction-centered approach, involves the assessment of 
"user fees," "subsidies," or "charges" against those who deplete the commons by polluting. 
See, e.g., G. BJORK, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY 112-18 (1984); P. DOWNING, ENVIRON-
MENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 193-94 (1984); Lahey, Economic Charges for Environmental 
Protection: Ocean Dumping Fees, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 305 (1984), see also Stewart, Economics, 
Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1985) (advocating 
system of tradable environmental permits as economic incentive to creation of pollution 
controls). Through such fees, the true cost to society of the consumed resources are internal-
ized in the polluter's operation. 
Generally, however, the question of citizens' property rights in common natural resources 
has troubled legal scholars. Professor Sax, one of the rejuvenators of the common law public 
trust doctrine, initially rejected the idea that it gave citizens real property rights in trust 
resources, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 478-83 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax, Public Trust). 
He stated that the existence of such property rights would imply an "irrevocable commitment" 
of resources to public use, a type of commitment that rarely binds the sovereign. Id. at 480. 
Also, he noted, the public could hardly suffer a "taking" of property, in that the reciprocal 
benefits it received from any government act or regulation would necessarily be proportionate 
to its loss of common property rights, unlike the case when small classes of property owners 
were regulated. Id. at 479. Sax preferred to characterize the trust as a "name" or device for 
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communal duty to minimize adverse impacts to the state's ecosys-
tems, and an equally wide-ranging power to enforce that duty.14 
Perhaps predictably,15 however, the type of regime envisioned at 
the time these statutes were enacted has not fully materialized. State 
judiciaries faced with unfamiliar new public rights have caused the 
caselaw under these statutes to develop along restricted doctrinal 
patterns. Ill-fitting common law concepts have been engrafted onto 
the statutory causes of action, statutory terms have been interpreted 
in ways that limit the citizen-plaintiff's enforcement power, and 
unresolved constitutional questions have been permitted to cloud the 
statutes' futures. Consequently, the effectiveness of these laws as 
tools of environmental protection has recently come into question, 
and the efficacy of citizen suits under these statutes may have to be 
reevaluated. 
This Comment will first examine the basic elements of the public 
trust citizen suit statutes; next it will discuss the various approaches 
taken by courts to limit their potency. In conclusion, this Comment 
will propose that these judicial trends be abandoned, and that these 
focusing judicial scrutiny on legislative and administrative resource allocation decisions. [d. 
at 509. In later writings, however, as Professor Lazarus points out, Sax began to edge toward 
more property-oriented language in describing the trust, emphasizing the use of the doctrine 
to protect publicly held "expectations" about trust resource management which merited the 
same protection as "conventional private property rights." Sax, Liberating the Public Trust 
Doctrinefrom Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 185, 188-89 (1980); see also Lazarus, 
Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 643 (1986). Other commentators are even more 
vehement in advancing a property law basis for the public trust doctrine, see V. YANNECONE, 
B. COHEN, & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES 14 (1972); Coquilette, 
Mosses From an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historical Property Cases About the 
Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 810-13 (1979). Professor Lazarus, however, con-
cludes, after reviewing the American cases decided under the public trust doctrine, that the 
doctrine conveys no real property rights on the public, but rather serves as a "legal fiction" 
employed to enable courts to address the merits of environmental controversies. Lazarus, 
supra, at 656. 
14 See Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. 294, 306, 224 N.W.2d 883,888 (1975) 
("[M)EP A ... imposes a duty on individuals and organizations both in the public and private 
sectors to prevent or minimize degradation of the environment .which is caused or is likely to 
be caused by their activities"). See also Dimento, Citizen Environmental Legislation in the 
States: An Overview, 53 J. URB. L. 413, 416 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Dimento, Overview). 
15 As early as 1970, Professor Sax had noted the tendency of courts faced with difficult 
cases to construe environmental statutes restrictively: 
To some extent, special obligations toward particular resources are imposed by 
statutory or constitutional provisions, rather than by judicially-developed theory. 
The laws, however, are subject to great judicial manipulation and the case is very 
rare in which a court feels compelled to adopt a standard more rigorous than that 
which it desires to impose. 
Sax, Public Trust, supra note 13, at 478 n.27. 
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citizen suit laws be liberally construed in order to encourage envi-
ronmentally-sympathetic planning and resource development. 
II. THE ELEMENTS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST STATUTES 
MEPA and its successors were drafted to embody the ancient 
principles of the public trust doctrine. 16 Professor Joseph Sax, 
MEPA's initial author and one of its chief architects, had by 1970 
identified the public trust doctrine as the foundation of a new type 
of environmental law, a law which would give substance to the then-
developing concepts of public resource rights, and allow for direct 
citizen action to defend those rightsY Although in its ancient com-
mon law form the doctrine had been used to safeguard important 
resource bases from harmful government resource allocation deci-
sions,18 the common law cause of action was inherently limited as a 
private litigation tool. The geographic reach of the doctrine tradi-
tionally had been limited to the shoreline and land beneath navigable 
waterways.19 Even where established trust resources were the sub-
jects of public trust suits, the substantive applications of the public 
trust doctrine by the courts have been inconsistent. Courts have 
applied different substantive standards in different types of cases. 
For example, the trust sometimes offered little protection, even 
against the state, in cases where a resource was diverted to another 
use beneficial to the public. 20 On the other hand, the common law 
16 See supra note 7. 
17 See J.Sax, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 158-74 
(1970); Sax, Public Trust, supra n.13 at 474 n.14. 
18 See, e.g., Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 397 (1892). 
19 See V. YANNECONE, B. COHEN, & S. DAVISON, supra note 13, at 16; W. RODGERS, 
HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 172 (1977). Commentators are divided over the doc-
trine's potential for more widespread geographic applicability. Professor Sax fears that the 
trust, despite brief forays inland, may stay largely confined to its traditional sphere: 
My impression is that the public trust doctrine may well remain limited to the 
shore and its immediate environs, ... while, at the same time the goals and basic 
ideas underlying the trust will continue to enlarge through the medium of enabling 
statutes, such as coastal zone or fragile area acts, and through the modification and 
expansion of cognate techniques such as re-interpretation of standard zoning author-
ity and the permissible scope of subdivision exactions. 
Sax, The Potential for Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine, at 10 (1984) (unpublished 
manuscript). But see Lazarus, supra note 13, at 647-50 (discussion of cases expanding the 
geographic reach of the public trust doctrine). 
20 See id. at 651-52. Professor Lazarus isolates three categories of judicial standards em-
ployed by courts in deciding public trust cases. Under the standard which mandates the lowest 
level of scrutiny regarding government resource decisions, courts require only that a "public 
trust purpose" be satisfied by the challenged resource use. This may amount to little more 
than a "rational basis" type of scrutiny, see id. at 651. Thus, despite the public trust's frequent 
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public trust doctrine offered those who drafted environmental leg-
islation some important bedrock concepts, namely, that the public 
shared common ownership of certain beneficial rights2l to distinctly 
"public" resources,22 and that those rights created judicially enforce-
able remedies. 23 The public trust statutes built on these fundamental 
concepts by clarifying the public's standing rights, expressly setting 
out substantive burdens of proof, and explicitly widening the cata-
logue of protected resources. 
A. Standing 
One of the most basic motivational forces behind citizen suit stat-
utes was a growing distrust of the administrative process, and of 
the state's ability to act as the sole guardian of the environment. 
MEPA, MERA, and CEPA were designed to facilitate public inter-
vention in key resource decisions by forcing these decisions into the 
judicial forum, where they could proceed free from the delay and 
political pressures that too often characterized administrative pro-
ceedings.24 In order to fully advance this public oversight, the laws 
utility in environmental cases, it has been burdened with significant limitations. Even within 
a given jurisdiction, public trust jurisprudence may not clearly define key public trust concepts, 
leaving commentators with more questions than answers about the doctrine's substantive 
components, see Olson, The Public Trust Doctrine: Procedural and Substantive Limitations 
on the Governmental Re-Allocation of Natural Resources in Michigan, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 
161, 203-09. In attempts to apply the trust to privately-owned resources, courts have some-
times been reluctant to upset private property rights in favor of public trust rights. Compare 
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); Opinion of the Justices, 
313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974). 
21 See W. RODGERS, supra note 19, at 182. 
22 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 13, at 484-85. Professor Sax emphasizes that the 
doctrine most readily applies to natural resources whose "public" character makes them 
"inappropriate" objects of private ownership. Id. at 485. 
23 Public trust-based causes of action have been expressly recognized in the majority of 
American states. See Lazarus, supra note 13, at 644 n.77 for a listing by state of some of the 
most important recent public trust cases. 
24 In his book, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action, Professor Sax 
expressed skepticism about the ability of administrators who are constantly subjected to 
interest group pressure to settle environmental controversies. Citizen lawsuits, he felt, would 
allow plaintiffs to avoid agency inertia, and sidestep administrative decision-makers' distaste 
for defending their own initial decisions: 
The court [hearing a citizen suit] is spared the responsibility for opening sensitive 
questions - indeed, in a number of environmental lawsuits, judges have made it a 
point to comment from the bench that they do not seek out controversies and would 
be just as happy to be left alone, but that if a citizen comes to them with a complaint, 
they have a duty to respond. Moreover, the traditional legal process is particularly 
responsive to this problem of citizen initiative. Not only is there no "political screen-
ing" of cases, but once a complaint is filed, the judicial process moves inexorably 
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conveyed standing to virtually any citizen, citizens' group, or cor-
poration. 25 Litigation challenges to the standing of plaintiffs under 
the Acts have proven almost uniformly unsuccessful. 26 
Connecticut, however, has struggled with this liberal expansion 
of the law. In Belford v. City of New Haven, 27 a group of New Haven 
forward. Pleadings are filed, testimony taken, requests for particular relief are put 
forward and must be acted upon. It is not in the nature of the judicial process - as 
it so often is with complaints made elsewhere in the governmental system - for a 
matter to be shelved, put off for interminable study, or met with a form letter noting 
that some official is glad to hear of the matter and will certainly give it his consid-
eration (someday, maybe). 
J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 111-12 (1971). 
The idea of an unresponsive administrative bureaucracy, and the need for direct citizen 
participation has been echoed many times since. See, e.g., L. CALDWELL, L. HAYES & 1. 
MACWHIRTER, CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRONMENT xvii-xx (1976). Even MEPA's detractors 
recognized, at the time of the Act's passage, that administrative deficiencies prompted its 
enactment, see Thibodeau, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: Panacea or 
Pandora's Box, 48 J. URB. L. 579, 581 (1971). 
In order to bring a MEPA suit, it is not required that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative 
remedies, see Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress 
Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1004, 1019 (1972); it is not a defense to show compliance with an 
agency standard or permit. MEPA permits courts to remand parties to agency proceedings 
while retaining jurisdiction over the controversy to ensure that the agency complies with 
MEPA's substantive mandates, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(204)(2) (1980), see also CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-18(b) (1985), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.08, subd. 1 (1977). Courts 
review agency actions de novo. See West Michigan Envtl. Action Council v. Natural Resources 
Comm'n, 405 Mich. 741, 275 N.W.2d 538, cert. denied 444 U.S. 941 (1979), see also CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-18(c) (1985). MEPA directly imposes similar environmental standards 
on courts and agencies; agencies are prohibited from authorizing conduct that is likely to 
pollute, impair or destroy natural resources if a feasible and prudential alternative is available. 
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(205)(2) (1980), see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-19(b) 
(1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.09, subd. 2 (1977). In addition, a MEPA court may, if it 
finds agency standards insufficient to protect resources, rewrite those standards. MICH. STAT. 
ANN. § 14.528(202)(2) (1980); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.1O, subds. 1-3 (1977) (sep-
arate judicial procedure remanding deficient standard or rule for agency reconsideration); but 
see infra note 242. 
Lastly, courts have recognized the importance of citizen enforcement in MEPA's scheme of 
environmental control. See Ray, 393 Mich. at 305, 224 N.W.2d at 887-88; Daniels v. Allen 
Indus., Inc., 391 Mich. 398, 410-11, 216 N.W.2d 762, 768 (1974). 
25 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (1980); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.02, subd. 2, 116B.03, subd. 1 (1977). 
26 Slone, The Michigan Environmental Protection Act: Bringing Citizen-Initiated Environ-
mental Suits Into the 1980's, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 271, 315 (1985) ("[N]o court has ever denied 
standing to a plausible plaintiff, whether it be a statewide environmental organization, a 
neighborhood group, a public agency, or a private party"); see also Minnesota Public Interest 
Research Group v. White Bear Rod And Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 771 n.6 (Minn. 1977) 
(fact that state pollution control agency did not set standards for impulsive sounds did not bar 
plaintiffs from alleging noise pollution under MERA); Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 
184 Conn. 51, 57, 441 A.2d 68, 73-74 (1981) (CEPA standing automatically conveyed to any 
plaintiff). 
27 170 Conn. 46, 364 A.2d 194 (1975). 
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residents brought a CEPA suit to challenge the construction of an 
olympic-style rowing course on city parkland. The state supreme 
court held that the citizens' group lacked standing to challenge the 
city's legislative act, since the decision itself did "not directly 
threaten the public trust in the air, water, and other natural re-
sources" of the state. 28 A CEP A plaintiff, the court held, would be 
allowed to protect natural resources from impairment, but the liti-
gant would not be permitted to use the statute as a means indirectly 
to challenge purely legislative policy choices.29 In Belford, the court 
found that the plaintiffs' interests were not sufficiently concrete to 
accord them standing to contest the city's act. 
The rationale of Belford seemed to be grounded in more estab-
lished principles of standing, principles that CEPA expressly 
superseded. Clearly, CEP A was intended to apply to the actions of 
state and local government instrumentalities. In light of the statute's 
emphasis on prevention,30 it is difficult to imagine that the plaintiffs' 
standing should not be granted until actual physical damage to the 
resource was imminent. Such a reading would rob the law of one of 
its key aspects: its ability to permit plaintiff intervention during the 
planning stages of environmentally-questionable projects. 
The confusion engendered by Belford was dispelled six years later 
in Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton. 31 In Manches-
ter Environmental, the plaintiff sued to halt the development of a 
393-acre industrial park. The trial court had held, consistent with 
Belford, that the plaintiff's standing depended on the Coalition's 
ability to make out a prima facie case under the terms of CEP A.32 
The state supreme court reversed, and thus reversed its own holding 
in Belford. Standing under CEPA, the court held, was "automatically 
granted ... to 'any person' under the law's provisions."33 The deci-
sion, by simply invoking the plain meaning of the law's terms, suc-
cessfully aligned its reading of CEP A with both the Michigan and 
Minnesota cases interpreting citizen suit standing,34 and with federal 
cases that separated questions of standing from the substance of 
claims.35 Manchester Environmental thus affirmed the rights of 
28 Id. at 54, 364 A.2d at 199. 
'ZiJ Id. 
30 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-17 (1985) (plaintiff may establish prima facie case by 
showing that defendant's conduct is "reasonably likely" to cause environmental damage). 
31 184 Conn. 51, 441 A.2d 68 (1981). 
32 Id. at 57, 441 A.2d at 73. 
33 Id. at 57, 441 A.2d at 73-74. 
34 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
35 See, e.g., Association of Data Processors v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1969). 
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CEP A plaintiffs to defend the type of novel environmental interests 
created by the statute's provisions. 
The effects of public trust citizens suit statutes, however, are 
limited in certain ways. These laws' extensive grants of standing 
may not expand the standing provisions of other state statutes, even 
though the environmental duties created by the public trust laws 
are incorporated into other laws of the state. 36 Thus, CEPA did not 
give a plaintiff standing to seek injunctive relief under environmental 
licensing statutes that contained more limited standing provisions. 37 
In addition, MEP A plaintiffs seeking to intervene in an ongoing suit 
may lack standing, despite the public trust statutes' liberal standing 
policies, if a court deems intervention to be merely permissive. 38 
Plaintiffs seeking permissive intervention may have to demonstrate 
that an existing plaintiff is not representing them adequately. 39 
B. The Prima Facie Case 
Plaintiffs under the public trust citizen suit statutes, in order to 
establish a prima facie case, must demonstrate that the defendant's 
conduct has caused, or is likely to cause, the pollution, impairment 
36 See Michigan Oil Co. v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 406 Mich. 1, 33, 276 N.W.2d 141, 
150 (MEPA incorporated into all state statutes governing natural resources, cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 980 (1979); Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 186, 220 
N.W.2d 416, 428 (1974) (MEPA duties incorporated into other state statutes; MEPA duties 
must be considered in administering state Highway Condemnation Act). 
37 City of Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 192 Conn. 591, 472 A.2d 787 (1984). See 
also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SCHOOL OF LAW, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN 123 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
IN MICHIGAN]. 
38 Wayne County Dep't of Health v. Chrysler Corp., 43 Mich. App. 235, 203 N.W.2d 912 
(1972). However, other forces than simple statutory interpretation may have led to the 
Chrysler case's restrictive view ofMEPA intervention. While the trial judge initially permitted 
a neighborhood citizens' group to intervene, in the hopes of advancing "communication and 
understanding and exchange" between the parties, his attitude changed dramatically when 
all parties but the citizens' group agreed to a proposed consent order. At that time, the judge 
labelled the group's intervention "permissive." The trial court's decision was later upheld on 
appeal. See Sax & Connor, supra note 24, at 1070-72. 
The original version of MEPA drafted by Professor Sax gave plaintiffs the right to intervene 
in administrative or judicial proceedings. "Permissive" language was substituted, however, in 
a later draft. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(205)(1) (1980), but see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22a-19(a) (1985), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.09, subd. 1 (1977). Interestingly, Professor Sax 
claimed to have no recollection of why the change was made, nor did his research uncover 
any legislative discussion of the permissive intervention provision prior to MEPA's passage. 
Sax & Conner, supra note 24, at 1070 n.270. 
Recent developments indicate that courts may be more willing to support citizen MEPA 
intervention in administrative agency proceedings. See Slone, supra note 26, at 312-13. 
39 Chrysler Corp., 43 Mich. App. at 236,203 N.W.2d at 913. 
448 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:439 
or destruction of the air, water, land, or other natural resources of 
the state. 40 MERA contains an additional provision that permits the 
plaintiff to make out a prima facie case simply by proving that the 
defendant has violated, or is likely to violate, an existing environ-
mental permit, license, regulation or standard. 41 
1. "Natural Resource" 
The class of resources that falls within the statutory definitions of 
"natural resource" has, as a general rule, been liberally construed. 
While air and water are explicitly mentioned, the Acts have also 
been applied in cases involving excessive fishing,42 the removal of 
trees,43 the possible despoilation of sand dunes,44 adverse impacts 
on elk,45 and a number of other common wildlife species and unex-
ceptional natural areas. 46 Although efforts have been made to per-
suade courts to narrow the resource definition,47 few, if any, resource 
categories seem to lie outside the Acts' provisions. However, certain 
attempts to extend the coverage of public trust laws beyond their 
intended spheres of operation have been skeptically viewed by the 
courts. 
40 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (1980); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (1977). CEPA includes the qualification that pollution which is the 
subject of a citizen suit be "unreasonable." However, this language was only intended to 
discourage frivolous actions, not to substantially raise the prima facie case threshold. See 
Manchester Environmental, 184 Conn. at 58 & n.lO, 441 A.2d at 74 & n.lO; Johnson, The 
Environmental Protection Act of 1971, 46 CONN. B.J. 422, 429-31 (1972). An effort to insert 
"unreasonable" impairment into the provisions of MEPA failed in the Michigan legislature. 
See Note, Michigan Environmental Protection Act: Political Background, 4 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 358, 363-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Political Backgroundl. 
41 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03, subd. 1 (1977). 
42 Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony, 90 Mich. App. 990, 280 N.W.2d 883 
(1979). 
43 Eyde v. Michigan, 82 Mich. App. 531,267 N.W.2d 442 (1978); Stevens v. Creek, 121 Mich. 
App. 503, 328 N.W.2d 672 (1982); Irish v. Green, 4 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1402 (Mich. Cir. 
Ct. 1972). 
44 Lincoln Township v. Manley Bros., No. 74-001113-CE (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 20, 1974). 
45 West Michigan Envtl. Action Council, Inc. v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 405 Mich. 741, 
275 N.W.2d 538, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979). 
46 See Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. at 167, 220 N.W.2d at 419 (11.04 acre swamp); Kimberly Hills 
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. App. 495, 504-05, 320 N.W.2d 668, 672 (1982), lv. 
denied, 417 Mich. 1045 (1983) (four acre area including seasonal holding pond, common plant 
and animal species). 
47 In the Kimberly Hills case, discussed infra at notes 115, 140-53 and accompanying text, 
the appellants proposed a more restrictive resource definition for MEPA cases. The proposed 
definition of "natural resource" would include only those resources that were "relatively rare 
or in some way ecologically important." Brief for Appellants at 6, Kimberly Hills Neighborhood 
Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. App. 495, 320 N.W.2d 668 (1982). 
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It has been held, for example, that MEP A does not protect his-
torical or cultural "environments." In Poletown Neighborhood Coun-
cil v. City of Detroit, 48 the Michigan Supreme Court held that MEPA 
could not be invoked to prevent the condemnation of a large section 
of an ethnic neighborhood. Such non-natural environments, the court 
held, clearly were not contemplated by the statute's drafters as the 
proper subjects of MEPA lawsuits. 49 Careful drafting has helped to 
avoid this problem in Connecticut and Minnesota, however, where 
historical resources are explicitly included within the statutory def-
inition of "resource. "50 
MERA also expressly protects "quietude. "51 In the absence of such 
an express provision, however, it remains unclear whether noise 
pollution harms a resource comprehended by a public trust citizen 
suit statute. 52 The application of these Acts to such inchoate re-
sources is still a subject for scholarly speculation. A community's 
sense of aesthetics may also fall outside of the resource definition. 53 
It is thus unclear whether conduct lacking readily quantifiable effects 
on generally accepted natural resources or species can be remedied 
through a citizen suit brought under the public trust statutes. Even 
a resource that has been held to fall under MEPA or its progeny 
may be unprotected in a particUlar case if that resource is viewed 
as an economic amenity, valued for its contribution to property 
values, rather than a natural resource valued for its ecological sig-
nificance. 54 
The resource definition may not be used to turn citizen suit laws 
into developers' tools. One recent case, Whittaker & Gooding Co. v. 
Scio Township Zoning Board of Appeals, 55 demonstrated that the 
48 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). 
49 [d. at 635,304 N.W.2d at 460. 
50 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-19a (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subd. 4 (1977). 
51 [d. Excessive noise was an important issue in the Minnesota Pub. Interest Research 
Group v. White Bear Rod and Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977), discussed infra at 
notes 96-114 and accompanying text. 
52 See West Michigan Envtl. Action Council, Inc. v. Natural Resources Comm'n, No. 76-
19335-CE, (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 6, 1977) at A1246 ("not clear" that noise pollution falls under 
MEPA). References are to an unpublished oral opinion of the trial court [hereinafter cited as 
Trial Opinion]. A transcript is available at the law offices ofVanderkloot & Haynes, Bloomfield 
Hills, Michigan. 
53 See City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Rd. Comm'n, 136 Mich. App. 276, 282, 355 
N.W.2d 913, 916 (1984) ("Esthetic considerations alone are not determinative of significant 
environmental impact"); see also Haynes, supra note 11, at 621 n.126, Slone, supra note 27, 
at 285 n.107. But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subd. 4 (1977) (MERA covers "scenic and 
esthetic" resources when resources owned by government unit or agency). 
54 See Slone, supra note 26, at 285 n.107. 
55 117 Mich. App. 18,323 N.W.2d 574 (1982). 
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Michigan judiciary would not uphold efforts to facilitate development 
activities through MEPA suits. 56 In that case, the plaintiff, an op-
erator of a gravel pit, claimed that the defendant Board's denial of 
a permit modification impaired a "natural resource" by preventing 
it from extracting the gravel deposits. The contention that the de-
velopment of the resource constituted part of the resource itself for 
MEPA purposes was summarily rejected by the court of appeals. 57 
2. "Pollution, Impairment, or Destruction" 
Of the three statutes herein examined, only MERA contains an 
attempt to define "pollution, impairment, or destruction" within its 
provisions;58 MEPA and CEPA leave the term open to case-by-case 
development under the statutorily-created "common law of environ-
mental quality. "59 Courts' efforts to formulate a durable standard of 
"impairment" have resulted, as will be discussed,60 in a potentially 
significant diminution of MEPA's usefulness and, by implication,61 
the usefulness of MERA and CEPA as well. Interestingly, this 
development in MEP A law has occurred despite the opinions of 
numerous commentators that the law's prima facie case threshold 
was intended to offer plaintiffs only a minimal hurdle to clear,62 and 
the contrary precedent established by early MEP A cases which 
56 See Slone, supra note 26, at 285; Trepod & Yeager, The Michigan Environmental Pro-
tection Act: Pervasive!, 64 MICH. B.J. 187, 189 (1985). 
57 117 Mich. App. at 23, 323 N. W.2d at 576. 
58 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subd. 5 (1977). 
59 See Ray, 393 Mich. at 306,224 N.W.2d at 888: 
[The legislature] left to courts the important task of giving substance to the [pollution, 
impairment or destruction] standard by developing a common law of environmental 
quality. The Act [MEPA] allows courts to fashion standards in the context of actual 
problems as they arise in individual cases and to take into consideration changes in 
technology which the legislature, at the time of the Act's passage, could not hope to 
foresee. 
See also Wayne County Dep't of Health v. Olsonite Corp., 79 Mich. App. 668, 693, 263 N.W.2d 
778, 791 (1977), Iv. denied, 402 Mich. 845 (1978), Haynes, supra note 11, at 605. 
60 See infra notes 128-82 and accompanying text. 
61 MEPA provided the model for both MERA and CEPA, see Bryden, Environmental 
Rights in Theory and Practice, 62 MINN. L. REV. 163, 175 (1978); Johnson, supra note 40, 
at 426. Consequently, courts in Connecticut, Minnesota, and other states may look to Michigan 
opinions for guidance in interpreting their own environmental protection acts. See People for 
Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibility (PEER) v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Coun-
cil, 266 N.W.2d 858,866 n.9 (Minn. 1978). 
62 See Abrams, Thresholds of Harm in Environmental Litigation: The Michigan Environ-
mental Protection Act as a Model of a Minimal Requirement, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 107, 
109-11 (1983); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN, supra note 37, at 129--30. 
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construed the statute liberally to achieve its stated environmental 
goals. 63 
C. The Affirmative Defense Provisions 
The defendant in a public trust citizen suit may escape liability in 
two ways: she may successfully refute the plaintiff's prima facie 
case, or she may invoke the affirmative defense offered by the stat-
utes. 64 Under the Acts, the defendant is permitted to demonstrate 
that there is "no feasible and prudent alternative" to the challenged 
conduct and65 that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of 
the public health, safety, and welfare when considered in light of the 
state's "paramount concern"66 for the protection of its natural re-
sources. 
These affirmative defense provisions have generally proved to be 
of little use to the environmental defendant. 67 Courts typically use 
established readings of the statutes' "feasible and prudent" language 
to create rigorous burdens of proof. 68 Rarely can a defendant suc-
cessfully establish a statutory affirmative defense. The high cost of 
an environmentally-sound course of action, by itself, is clearly not 
enough to render it infeasible or imprudent.69 Nor is the fact that 
large sums of money have already been invested in the challenged 
course of conduct. 70 Courts may temper their strictness when the 
threatened environmental impairment is minor, and when alterna-
tives impose significant burdens on defendants or represent possible 
63 See Abrams, supra note 62, at 114. 
64 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-17(a) (1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(203)(1) (1980); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04 (1977). Under MERA, no affirmative defense is available when 
the defendant is alleged to have violated any environmental quality standard, limitation, 
regulation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit. [d. 
65 An attempt to replace "and" with "or" in the affirmative defense provision failed to pass 
the Michigan legislature. See Note, Political Background, supra note 40 at 363-68. 
66 "Paramount" has been defined to mean "superior to all others." Floodwood-Fine Lakes 
Citizens' Group v. Minnesota, 287 N.W.2d 390 (Minn. 1979). 
67 See Abrams, supra note 62, at 115-17, Slone, supra note 26 at 278, 288, 295. 
68 See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 331, 499 F.2d 467 
(1974), and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), discussed in 
Olsonite Corp., 79 Mich. App. at 703-06, 263 N.W.2d at 796-97. 
69 See Manchester Envtl., 184 Conn. at 62, 441 A.2d at 76; Olsonite Corp., 79 Mich. App. 
at 704,263 N.W.2d at 796 (quoting Hodgson, 162 U.S. App. D.C. at 341-42,499 F.2d at 477-
78); Urban Council on Mobility v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, 289 N.W.2d 729 
(Minn. 1980); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04 (1977) ("Economic considerations alone 
shall not constitute a defense hereunder. "). 
70 Urban Council on Mobility, 289 N. W.2d at 735. 
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public hazards. 71 In most cases involving more significant environ-
mental degradation, however, only highly unusual or compelling 
factors have been sufficient to establish an affirmative defense. The 
public trust statutes were not designed merely to force actors to 
disclose the reasons for their conduct. 72 They go much further than 
that. The laws were written to get to the "guts" of environmental 
controversies,73 to force defendants to weigh alternative methods for 
achieving their goals, and then to choose the most environmentally 
desirable courses of action. 74 By denying defendants an easy method 
71 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN, supra note 37, at 129. See also Sax & Conner, 
supra note 24, at 1037, 1066-67 (discussion of Crandall v. Biergans). An interesting case 
suggesting the possible interplay of an EPA's prima facie case and affirmative defense com-
ponents is Lake Williams Beach Ass'n v. Gilmer Bros., 496 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1985). In Lake 
Williams, the defendant, a plastics company, owned a 19th-century dam and the right to 
impound waters in a man-made lake. After a 1976 federal inspection judged the dam unsafe, 
the state Department of Environmental Protection asked the defendant to lower the water 
level in the lake pending further study of the problem. The defendant chose to lower the 
water level by about three feet. The lake level fluctuated considerably after the defendant's 
act, and at times, the lake was almost completely drained of water. This consequent reduction 
of the water level caused a decline in the property values of plaintiff's members and interfered 
with their recreational use of the lake. The suit was brought in two counts; one claim sounded 
in common law riparian rights, while the other alleged a CEPA violation. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court, summarily dismissing the feasibility of alternative forms of conduct, held 
that an affirmative defense under CEPA had been established. The opinion seemed to indicate, 
however, that the court was focused more intently on common law riparian rights doctrines 
than the substantive duties imposed by CEPA. Citing a series of water rights cases, the court 
held that the defendant had acted "reasonably" in drawing down the lake's water level. This 
"reasonableness" did not appear to be a reference to the CEPA "unreasonable" impairment 
standard, which is clearly meant only to discourage frivolous suits, see supra note 40. Rather, 
this reasonableness described the conduct of a riparian owner under the common law, and 
precluded other riparian owners from enjoining his actions in a common law suit. Thus, despite 
the interesting fact situation presented by the case, it is unclear from whence the court 
derived its opinion; the opinion could be an example of the tension between CEPA's prima 
facie case and affirmative defense provisions, or it could simply be the result of an improper 
mingling of standards from two discrete and separate areas of law. 
72 See Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). Gould 
was a case involving the application of the prior public use doctrine to public trust property. 
In its opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated a lease and a management 
contract between the state and a private developer who sought to construct and operate a ski 
resort on the site of the state-owned Mt. Greylock State Reservation. The court held that the 
legislature could only convey such public lands to private developers by clearly and explicitly 
authorizing the new use in a separate enactment. Thus, the prior public use doctrine, like the 
public trust doctrine, functioned to protect public rights in property devoted to public uses 
by forcing adequate disclosure of resource decisions and SUbjecting those decisions to open 
political debate. See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 13, at 491-502; see also Comment, The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 839, 869-
86 (1984). 
73 Olson, The MEPA: An Experiment that Works, 64 MICH. B.J. 181 (1985) [hereinllfter 
cited as Olson, Experiment]. 
74 Professor Sax stated in an amicus brief filed in the Kimberly Hills case: 
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of justifying proposed or current activities that harm statutorily-
protected resource values, the laws force the parties to consider and 
implement alternative courses of conduct when the situation so re-
quires. 75 
CEPA seems to offer a defendant the most flexible language 
around which to structure an affirmative defense. It lacks the "par-
amount concern" language of MEPA and MERA, and includes the 
qualification that alternatives must be weighed "considering all rel-
evant surrounding circumstances and factors."76 Yet even Connect-
icut courts have not been overly receptive to defendants' affirmative 
defense claims. In Manchester Environmental, the plaintiffs as-
serted that the use of mass transit was a feasible alternative to 
planned highway modifications that would have significantly in-
creased automobile traffic to the challenged industrial park. The 
state supreme court agreed that the mass transit alternative was 
both feasible and prudent, although it would have involved a major 
change in governmental policy for which no planning had previously 
been undertaken and no money had been budgeted. 77 
CEPA's affirmative defense has been successfully invoked, how-
ever, despite the courts' insistence on extraordinary factors, where 
the complained-of resource impairment seemed "reasonable" and the 
defendant lacked the opportunity to choose an environmentally-sen-
sitive course of action. In Lake Williams Beach Association v. Gil-
man Brothers,78 the defendant, owner of a 19th-century dam on a 
recreational lake, was faced with a Hobson's choice: the company 
could open its dam and lower the lake's water level pursuant to state 
and federal agency requests, thus impairing plaintiff's use of the 
lake for recreational purposes, or it could maintain the water level 
and risk dam collapse and flooding, as well as eventual administrative 
sanctions. In this situation, although the court found that the defen-
dant had indeed impaired a CEPA resource, it held the defendant's 
conduct to be "reasonable" and consequently ruled that it had estab-
lished an affirmative defense. From the court's holding, it can per-
MEPA was enacted to encourage people to make socially responsible decisions that 
consider environmental values in choosing between alternative means of reaching an 
objective without requiring them to bear an unconstitutionally heavy burden because 
they consider these values. 
Sax, Brief of Amicus Curiae at 17, Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. 
App. 495, 320 N. W.2d 668 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief]. 
75 See Abrams, supra note 62, at 117. 
76 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-17 (1985). 
77 Manchester Envtl., 184 Conn. at 62,441 A.2d at 76. 
7S 496 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1985). For a further discussion of the opinion, see supra n.7l. 
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haps be inferred that courts may view the affirmative defense pro-
visions less rigorously in cases where environmental damage 
primarily affects less-pressing recreational interests, the defendant's 
alternatives are limited, and the challenged conduct is designed to 
safeguard the public welfare. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty of employing the affirmative defense 
has led many defendants to forego it entirely. As a result, it is usually 
the prima facie case that becomes the most important area of legal 
controversy in these environmental citizen actions. 79 
III. JUDICIAL STRATEGIES RESTRICTING CITIZEN SUITS 
MEP A and the other citizen suit statutes establish general guide-
lines to be used by the courts in handling litigation arising under 
them. A certain amount of elasticity was intentionally built into the 
laws' provisions; courts retained the ability to give flexible interpre-
tations to statutory terms, and to tailor injunctive remedies to in-
dividual fact situations.80 The purpose of the statutes was to establish 
a new common law, a far-reaching regime capable of settling the 
broadest possible range of resulting environmental disputes within 
the statutory causes of action. 81 The court deciding a citizen claim 
would be free to create new statutory approaches as new types of 
controversies arose. The drafters of these laws may not have antic-
ipated that the judiciary, despite express statutory and, in some 
cases, constitutional language accentuating the primacy of environ-
mental protection,82 would use the Acts' built-in flexibility to weaken 
79 See Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. App. 495, 320 N.W.2d 668 
(1982) lv. denied, 417 Mich. 1045 (1983); Cook v. Grand River Power Co., 131 Mich. App. 821, 
346 N.W.2d 881 (1984); City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Rd. Comm'n, 136 Mich. App. 
276,355 N.W.2d 913 (1984); Rush v. Sterner, 143 Mich. App. 672,373 N.W.2d 183 (1985). 
80 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-18(a) (1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(204)(1) 
(1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.07 (1977). See also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN, 
supra note 37, at 138: 
[MEPA's equitable relief] provision allows courts to develop innovative and imag-
inative solutions to environmental problems and provides fertile ground for the 
development of the common law of environmental quality. The authority is particu-
larly useful in dealing with land use problems where the crux of the issue often is 
how to allow development to proceed in an manner consistent with the preservation 
of the environmental values of the trust. 
For examples of Michigan courts' flexible tailoring of equitable relief, see Irish, 4 Envtl. Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) at 1405; Kimberly Hills, 114 Mich. App. at 520-22, 320 N. W.2d at 679-80 (trial 
court order). 
81 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN, supra note 37, at 125; Abrams, supra note 62, at 
110. 
82 See MICH. CONST., art. IV, § 52: 
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby 
declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of health, safety, and 
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the statutory causes of action. The advent of these interpretive 
strategies forces us to re-examine the language and purpose of the 
laws, and to assess the compatibility of recent judicial decisions with 
long-range environmental protection goals. 
A. The "Front-Loaded" Equity Balance 
The notion of equity balancing, as it arose in nuisance law, gave 
courts a method of weighing an activity's benefit to society against 
its adverse effects on plaintiffs. By balancing the equities, a court 
was able to reach a solution that yielded the most beneficial overall 
use of resources to society as a whole. 83 To illustrate, where a man-
ufacturing business produced an essential product, was part of an 
essential industry,84 or represented a substantial capital invest-
ment,85 the nuisance complaints of neighboring landowners would 
not necessarily lead to injunctions, even when the existence of a 
nuisance was proven. 86 Nuisance law enabled the courts to accom-
modate the interests of the parties by permitting the nuisance to 
continue while awarding past or permanent damages to compensate 
injured defendants. 87 Clearly, the public trust laws, which address 
sensitive questions of resource allocation, require some mechanism 
that would permit a court to allow socially valuable enterprises to 
continue in extraordinary situations where equitable relief is not 
called for. However, the citizen suit statutes, unlike nuisance law, 
do not permit the award of damages. This mechanism, to function 
within the statutory scheme, would have to be consistent with the 
laws' environmental goals. It could not offer defendants an easy way 
out simply because their pollution-creating enterprises "benefit" the 
state's citizens. 
The drafters of MEPA understood this, and considered a number 
of alternative methods to accomplish this goal. 88 The Michigan leg-
islature finally settled on a statutory balancing test, incorporated in 
general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide for the protection of the 
air, water and other resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruc-
tion. 
83 See, e.g., Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economic.~ of Injunctive 
and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). 
84 See, e.g., Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chern. Co., 130 Conn. 485,35 A.2d 845 (1954). 
85 See, e.g., Roy v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 262 Mich. 663,247 N.W. 774 (1933). 
86 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870,309 N.Y.S.2d 312 
(1970). 
87 See id.; W. PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 88A at 631-32 (5th ed. 
1984). 
88 See Note, Political Background, supra note 40, at 363-68. 
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section 3(1) of MEPA.89 This test permits the court to consider the 
non-environmental public benefits of a defendant's conduct, but only 
within certain clearly defined parameters established to safeguard 
the Act's effectiveness as a plaintiff's tool. 90 The same balancing test 
was subsequently adopted in MERA.91 
Only after the plaintiff has established his prima facie case and 
the defendant has demonstrated that no feasible and prudent alter-
native exists to his conduct may the defendant invoke the statutory 
balancing test. The defendant may escape liability if he can demon-
strate that his conduct is sufficiently beneficial to the public health, 
safety and welfare to outweigh the state's paramount concern for 
environmental protection. 92 A court strictly adhering to the terms 
of MEPA or MERA would thus only begin to balance the equities 
at the time the defendant offered his affirmative defense, if indeed 
one was offered at all. Such a balancing test seemingly would be 
tilted in the plaintiff's favor by the state's primary concern for the 
environment. 
This approach makes sense when the public trust citizen suit laws 
are viewed as vehicles of compromise between socially beneficial 
private enterprise and the public's interest in sound environmental 
practice,93 not as specialized, codified nuisance laws which force the 
court to make hard choices: either to shut down the defendant's 
enterprise, or to permit the continual environmental degradation to 
go on unabated. MEPA permits plaintiffs to sue before environmen-
tally-threatening conduct takes its toll on natural resources. In ad-
dition, courts are given extremely wide remedial discretion in set-
tling cases. The paradigm MEP A case involves compromise between 
the parties, with injunctive relief merely going as far as necessary 
to preserve environmental interests. The court, while not empow-
ered to choose the best alternative for the defendant,94 may remedy 
89 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(203)(1) (1980). 
00 See Olsonite Corp., 79 Mich. App. at 703-06, 263 N.W.2d at 796-97; see also ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN, supra note 37, at 134-35, 155; Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 
7-8. 
91 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
92 See Haynes, supra note 11, at 599. 
93 See Sax & Dimento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the 
Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. I, 9 (1974); Haynes, supra note 
11, at 604-05; Slone, supra note 26, at 291 n.142, 297-98. 
94 See Irish v. Green, 4 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1402, 1403 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972) (court 
refused to mandate cluster development); Oscoda Chapter of PBB Action Comm., Inc. v. 
Dep't of Natural Resources, 403 Mich. 215, 232, 268 N.W.2d 240,247 (1978) (court refused to 
compel incineration of PBB-poisoned cattle). 
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defects in the planning or conduct of an activity stemming from 
insensitivity to resource protection goals. Since the statutory relief 
may be tailored to permit the defendant to carryon his activity in a 
manner compatible with environmental interests, there is less need 
for a nuisance-based equity balancing component. 
This statutory scheme has not gone undisturbed, however. The 
language of several key opinions in Minnesota and Michigan indicate 
that some courts may be in the process of reformulating the statutory 
balancing tests in ways contrary to the original intent of the legis-
latures that enacted the citizen suit statutes. These opinions have 
pushed the equity balance forward from the affirmative defense to 
the prima facie case. The implications of this development are sig-
nificant. The laws were written to include low prima facie case 
thresholds; clearly the greater burdens of environmental justification 
were to fall on defendants, frequently corporations or businesses 
with more access to data than the typical citizen plaintiff.95 Also, as 
previously mentioned, the light prima facie case burden enabled the 
court to proceed directly to the question of alternatives, the real 
heart of any MEPA or MERA controversy. Clearly, should courts 
examine the social value of a defendant's conduct at the prima facie 
case stage, the issue of preferable alternatives would never be 
reached in many instances, and the chance to grant equitable relief 
would be more increasingly foreclosed. 
1. The White Bear Case 
One of the first public trust citizen suit opinions to discuss equity 
balancing was Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. White 
Bear Rod and Gun Club. 96 The defendant, a non-profit recreational 
shooting club, operated a trap shooting range on land adjacent to 
95 See Olsonite Corp., 79 Mich. App. at 702, 263 N.W.2d at 795 (quoting Pierce, Sax & 
Irwin, Responses to "Thoughts on H.B. 3055", unpublished manuscript in the files of Professor 
Sax, University of Michigan Law School); Abrams, supra note 62, at 117. 
96 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977). But see Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808 
(Minn. 1977). Reserve Mining involved permit applications for the construction of a disposal 
facility for taconite tailings. The permits were denied by the state Department of Natural 
Resources and the state Pollution Control Agency. Affirming the trial court's decision, which 
overturned the agencies' permit denials, the state supreme court used language which may 
be interpreted as the seed of a prima facie MERA equity balance. When a challenged activity's 
public health effects are significantly adverse, the court stated, no consideration need be given 
the economic effects, such as a plant closing, of an agency decision on the surrounding area. 
However, where the likelihood of damage to the public is "remote and speCUlative," economic 
impacts which are "devastating and certain may be weighed in the balance to arrive at an 
environmentally sound decision." I d. 
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Rice Lake, an ecologically-fragile natural wetland area97 within the 
City of Hugo. An environmental organization brought suit under 
MERA to enjoin the club's shooting activities. The plaintiff claimed 
that the operation of the range caused excessive noise pollution, 
disturbing local residents. 98 More significantly, the plaintiff claimed 
that the noise from the shooting disrupted the use of the lake by 
migratory waterfowl,99 and that birds were dying from ingesting 
lead shot that fell into the lake. wo The lead shot, the plaintiffs al-
leged, also posed a threat to area drinking water supplies. WI 
The trial court enjoined the club from operating its shooting range, 
relying on the testimony of the plaintiff's wildlife experts. The trial 
judge need only have determined that the gun club polluted, im-
paired or destroyed a protected natural resource; White Bear did 
not plead MERA's affirmative defense. The trial court's findings of 
fact, however, included unusual language more compatible with a 
nuisance cause of action: 
The Court has weighed the benefits to users together with the 
fact of an apparently substantial investment as against the dam-
age likely to be caused to the protectable natural resources in 
the wetland area. The benefits of the Club are temporary. The 
desire and reasonable possibility is that the Rice Lake wetlands 
area would, but for the Club, otherwise be preserved perma-
nently and for future generations. 102 
While the result in White Bear was favorable to the environmental 
plaintiffs, the court's language raised a number of important ques-
tions regarding the role of equity balancing in the MERA scheme. 
It is unclear just where in the statute the court found language to 
support this balancing test, or what standards it employed in weigh-
97 The lake, a "natural bowl surrounded by hilly areas," was described at trial by one of the 
plaintiff's experts, Dr. Miron Heinselman, professor of ecology and behavioral biology at the 
University of Minnesota, as "an exceptionally fine example of a waterfowl lake .... [olne of 
the finest undeveloped waterfowl lakes in the Twin Cities area." Brief for Appellees at 7, 
Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762 
(Minn. 1977). Dr. Heinselman advised that the lake be purchased by the state and preserved 
in its natural state. Id. 
99 Complaint at 5-6, Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun 
Club, No. 44328, (Minn. Dist. Ct., April 19, 1976). 
99 Id. at 5. 
100 Id. 
!OIId. 
!O2 District Court's Findings of Fact at 12-13, Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. 
White Bear Rod & Gun Club, No. 44328, (Minn. Dist. Ct., April 19, 1976). 
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ing the cited factors. 103 While MERA contains a component weighing 
the activity's social utility, such balancing was designed to take place 
when an affirmative defense was asserted. Here, no affirmative 
defense was pleaded by the defendants,104 and thus it is difficult to 
conclude that the balance struck by the court is the same balance 
struck by the legislature. 105 A reader of the White Bear opinion could 
reasonably conclude that the weighing engaged in by the trial court 
did not involve the statutory balance at all, but rather a more nuis-
ance-oriented equity balance factored into the plaintiff's prima facie 
case.106 That the court's equity balancing was drawn from common 
law nuisance, rather than from the statute, is supported by the fact 
that the court did not, aside from a single conclusory sentence, 
discuss alternative modes of operation, the primary component of 
the affirmative defense balance, and that it did, like a court deciding 
a nuisance case, discuss the social benefits to be derived from the 
club's operation. 107 Consequently, the import of the case is unclear. 
Under a "front-loaded" equity balance, the social worth of the de-
103 See Note, A Balancing Test Adopted Under MERA - MPIRG v. White Bear Rod & 
Gun Club, 5 WM. MITCHELL L.REV. 270, 274-80 (1979) (discussion of the balancing test as 
found in the state supreme court's affirmance) [hereinafter cited as Note, Balancing Test]. 
104 White Bear, 257 N.W.2d at 781. 
105 See Note, Balancing Test, supra note 103, at 274 n.25. 
106 In a typical nuisance case, a court must weigh proofs offered by the plaintiff and the 
defendant to determine whether the defendant has acted "unreasonably." RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1978). Conduct is unreasonable if its social utility does not 
outweigh the gravity of the harm caused. Id. § 826(a). The White Bear trial court used the 
concept of "unreasonable" pollution to assess the plaintiff's prima facie case: 
The impact of noise from two gun clubs is more than it is reasonable to expect 
residents of the community near them to absorb. It is likely that it is impossible for 
the defendant club to operate without unreasonable natural acoustical degradation of 
the surrounding environment. 
District Court's Findings of Fact at 8, Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. White 
Bear Rod & Gun Club, No. 44328 (Minn. Dist. Ct. April 19, 1976) (Anderson, J.). See Smith 
v. W. Wayne County Conservation Ass'n, 380 Mich. 526, 158 N.W.2d 463 (1968) (defendant's 
operation of rifle range in sparsely-populated area not a nuisance; nuisance decided by effects 
of noise upon "ordinary reasonable man"). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826, 
comment c (1978) (equity balance inherent in "reasonable man" standard). It may be reasonable 
to say that the resemblance between the factual settings of certain statutory citizen suits and 
common law nuisance cases has invited trial courts to borrow reasoning from nuisance law. 
See Sax & Conner, s'upra note 24, at 1066-67 (discussion of trial court opinion in Crandall v. 
Biergans). 
107 See District Court's Findings of Fact at 11-13, Minnesota Pub. Interest Research 
Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, No. 44328, (Minn. Dist. Ct., April 19, 1976) (Anderson, 
J.). On the subject of alternative forms of conduct, the court simply notes that "[t]here are 
other feasible and prudent alternative places for the conduct of such shooting activities." The 
court goes into more detail in discussing the club's social utility. The Findings of Fact state 
the gun club held training programs for young shooters, and gave its adult members release 
from "general pressures and routines." 
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fendant's conduct would help determine whether he had polluted, 
impaired or destroyed the environment under the statute, and not 
simply whether his conduct outweighed the state's primary concern 
for resource protection. 
This inference - that the White Bear trial court utilized nuisance 
law balancing as part of MERA's prima facie case - was subse-
quently drawn, and approved, by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In 
fact, the supreme court's opinion explicitly affirmed the connection 
between the trial court's judicially-created balance and the type of 
balance frequently employed in common law nuisance cases: 
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act does not prescribe 
elaborate standards to guide trial courts, but allows a case-by-
case determination by use of a balancing test, analogous to the 
one traditionally employed by courts of equity, where the utility 
of a defendant's conduct which interferes with and invades nat-
ural resources is weighed against the gravity of harm resulting 
from such an interference or invasion. 108 
It is unclear why the White Bear court engrafted these traditional 
nuisance law concepts onto the MERA cause of action. Justice 
MacLaughlin, writing for the majority, gives us a clue by citing the 
Michigan case Ray v. Mason County Drain Commissioner109 in sup-
port of his nuisance analogy.110 The same citation was given in an 
amicus brief filed by the Sierra Club. That brief used nuisance law, 
not as a proposed framework for reviewing MERA claims, but 
merely to illustrate the principle that courts could integrate emerg-
ing social concerns into MERA's common law of environmental qual-
ity.111 The brief did not propose that nuisance concepts be integrated 
into MERA; it merely suggested that a court engaged in evolving a 
"common law" under MERA could integrate social concerns for the 
environment into its decisions, just as a nuisance court could. 
In the wake of White Bear, commentators expressed uncertainty 
about the role of this quasi-nuisance equity balance in the scheme of 
108 White Bear, 257 N.W.2d at 782. 
109 393 Mich. 294, 224 N. W.2d 883 (1975). 
110 White Bear, 257 N.W.2d at 782 n.12. 
III Brief of Amicus Curiae at 20, Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. White Bear 
Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977). The issue addressed in this section of the 
brief was whether courts or administrative agencies should control the outcome of environ-
mental disputes. Amicus cited Ray to show that courts bring a unique "integrating" power 
that "circumscribed and specialized" agencies did not possess, to environmental cases. Id. at 
16-17. Interestingly, one of the examples of judicial integration of social variables is the courts' 
changing approaches to environmental nuisance cases. Id. at 20. 
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MERA.112 The supreme court's opinion in the case did not resolve 
the question of where and how to apply this new test. The balance 
could have been "front-loaded" to help determine whether a defen-
dant's conduct involved "pollution, impairment or destruction" of a 
natural resource, or the courts could have used it at the remedial 
stage to determine the proper form of injunctive relief.113 Neither 
White Bear opinion disclosed precisely what role the gun club's social 
utility did play, but the injunction finally issued was a severe one, 
hinting that social utility was not a factor at the remedial stage. 114 
This unresolved question of statutory interpretation left courts free 
to read White Bear in support of their own "front-loading" doctrines. 
Thus, under doctrines like that implicitly adopted in White Bear, 
socially valuable activities could be accorded some form of wholly-
unintended "common law" exemption from equitable relief under the 
public trust citizen suit statutes. 
1I2 See Note, Balancing Test, supra note 103, at 277-79. 
1I3 [d. at 277-78. The author also examined two other possibilities: that the balance was 
used to weigh the defendant's rebuttal evidence, or that it was employed to assess the 
feasibility or prudence of alternatives. Both the defendant's failure to plead an affirmative 
defense, and the prior Minnesota caselaw condemning improper considerations of social utility 
in the affirmative defense, see County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bryson (Bryson II), 309 
Minn. 178, 187, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321 (1976), indicate that the club's social utility was not 
considered at that phase. Placing the balancing test at the rebuttal stage is not substantially 
different from making it an element of the plaintiff's prima facie showing, although the author 
disapproves of both. Note, Balancing Test, supra note 103, at 277-79. In either event, it is 
the extent of, not the alternatives to, pollution that is debated in the case. See Abrams, supra 
note 62, at 117. 
1I4 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's permanent injunction on all shooting activ-
ities. See District Court's Conclusions of Law at 13, Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group 
v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, No. 44328, (Minn. Dist. Ct., April 19, 1976) (Anderson, J.). 
In 1980, the club petitioned the Washington County District Court to lift the injuction, but 
the request was denied. Subsequently, the club installed a sound barrier around one of its 
shooting sites and in November, 1984, asked the City of Hugo to raise the forty decibel 
limitation in its original conditional use permit. This request, too, was denied. In White Bear 
Rod & Gun Club v. City of Hugo, 377 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. App. 1985), the court of appeals held 
that the city's denial did not violate the club's due process rights under either the state or 
federal constitution because, pursuant to the original injunction, any new evidence regarding 
pollution, impairment or destruction of the environment was to be submitted to the trial court, 
not the city. Under the circumstances of the case, the city lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
club's application for a permit amendment. [d. at 2-53. 
Like MEPA, MERA affords the court a great deal of flexibility in structuring its relief. 
Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REV. 575, 602 (1972). But the 
question remains: may the court use MERA's permissive language to balance the equities and 
avoid injunctive relief when a statutory violation has been proven? See Slone, supra note 26, 
at 316. For a discussion of the problem in the context of federal statutes, see Plater, Statutory 
Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524 (1982). Professor Plater argues 
that once a statutory violation has been proven, equity should not permit the violation to 
continue unabated, and that consequently, conduct violating the statute should be enjoined. 
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2. "Front-Loading" in Michigan 
Although no Michigan case has explicitly relied on White Bear, its 
presence can be found in MEP A opinions containing equity-balancing 
language,115 as well as a recent court of appeals opinion which ex-
plicitly condemns White Bears integration of social utility notions 
into MEPA's prima facie case. 116 
The trial court's opinion in West Michigan Environmental Action 
Council, Inc. v. Natural Resources Commission,117 one of the most 
controversial MEPA lawsuits to date, offers a good example of prima 
facie equity balancing. The litigation involved a challenge to the 
decision of the Natural Resources Commission (NRC) to grant ten 
experimental oil drilling permits for sites within the Pigeon River 
County State Forest. The trial judge held that the plaintiff had not 
115 Traces of the equity balancing doctrine can be found, for example, in the Kimberly Hills 
case, discussed infra at notes 140-53 and accompanying text. The defendant's arguments to 
the Michigan Court of Appeals were phrased in the vocabulary of "progress" and social utility: 
[T]he question is whether the impact on the mice, birds and squirrels rises to the 
level of impairment or destruction of a natural resource. If so, there will be no more 
building in the State of Michigan. 
Brief for Appellants at 6, Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. App. 495, 
320 N.W.2d 668 (1982). 
The defendants/appellants expressly asked the court to adopt a front-loaded balancing test, 
citing the White Bear case as persuasive authority: 
[A]pplication of [the White Bear opinion's] interpretation of the MEPA would require 
a finding by the trial court that defendants' proposed conduct would not be of sufficient 
value to offset the harm to society's natural resources .... 
[Ilt is completely consistent to interpret the statute as incorporating a balancing 
test within the standard required for the finding that the plaintiff has met the 
requirements of its prima facie showing, while prohibiting the redundant incorpora-
tion of the same test in defendants' standard for an affirmative defense. 
[d. at 10-11. 
The court of appeals declined the appellants' invitation to import the balancing test expressly 
into MEPA common law, but employed language that demonstrated the influence of appellants' 
arguments. In its modification of MEPA's prima facie case component, the "type of property 
involved" and the context in which that property is placed, were key elements in the Kimberly 
Hills court's decision. In its finding that the property was not suitable for preservation is the 
implicit corollary that it is more suitable for development. The court openly discusses the 
desirability of such residential construction: "[d]evelopment of the defendant's property will 
undoubtedly change the character of the neighborhood. Such changes, however, are inevitable 
on the borderline between urban and rural areas." 114 Mich. App. at 509,320 N.W.2d at 674 
(emphasis added). Notions of defendant's socially useful conduct may thus betray the presence 
of a submerged, "front-loaded" equity balance. 
116 City of Portage, 136 Mich. App. at 282-83, 355 N.W.2d at 916. In Olsonite Corp., the 
court of appeals held that the substantive provisions of MEP A supercede nuisance law when-
ever the two conflict. 79 Mich. App. at 689-94,263 N.W.2d at 789-92. For a general survey 
of the differences between MEPA's provisions and those of conventional nuisance law, see 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN, supra note 37, at 153-56. 
117 405 Mich. 741,275 N.W.2d 538, cert. denied 444 U.S. 941 (1979). 
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proven that the drilling's impact on the forest and its resident animal 
populations rose to the level of MEPA "impairment": 
As I have spoken of earlier in this lawsuit, the Commission 
has to balance the interest of many diverse groups in its decision. 
The work, obviously, of the state must go on. Progress, if we 
want to call it that, must be allowed, and the interests of some 
must be balanced against the interests of others. Defendant 
Commission has attended to that duty, the Court believes, and 
the adverse impact here described by the evidence would have 
been greater, more acutely persuasive, had they not acted as 
they did. 
The conduct is therefore approved and is not condemned as 
pollution, impairment or destruction. 118 
Left to their own devices, mission-oriented state agencies will 
frequently accord non-environmental objectives increased impor-
tance in reaching their decisions. 119 For that reason, MEPA enabled 
courts to reach their own decisions regarding the desirability of 
agency actions while placing primary emphasis on oft-ignored envi-
ronmental values. Permitting a prima facie equity balance in MEPA 
cases, in many instances, would mean sanctioning a principle of 
deference to agency decisions that would undercut one of MEPA's 
basic goals - ensuring the accountability of administrative bodies 
for decisions harming the environment. 
Echoing the court in White Bear, however, the West Michigan 
Environmental trial court invoked extra-statutory balancing in a 
case where no affirmative defense was pleaded. 120 Its balance of 
equities, and its tone of deference to agency decision-making pro-
cesses,121 reflect the trial court's "fundamental misconception"122 of 
MEPA's purpose and function. 
In City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Road Commission, 123 
the court of appeals expressly disapproved the front-loaded equity 
118 Trial Opinion, supra note 52, at A1255. 
119 See supra note 24; see also Note, Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970,4 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 121 (1970). 
120 405 Mich. at 754-55, 764,275 N.W.2d at 542,547. 
121 In West Michigan Environmental, the state supreme court expressly disfavored the trial 
court's tone of deference to agency decision-making. [d. at 753-54, 275 N.W.2d at 542. The 
trial judge had compared the NRC's decision to permit hydrocarbon development with envi-
ronmental "management decisions" designed to foster the proliferation of plant and animal 
populations. See Sax & Conner, supra note 24, at 1031 (discussing Payant v. Department of 
Natural Resources). The state supreme court rejected this analogy. 405 Mich. at 759-60, 275 
N.W.2d at 545, but see Kimberly Hills, 114 Mich. App. at 507-08, 320 N.W.2d at 673 (court 
of appeals' citation of Payant in support of holding). 
12'l 405 Mich. at 759,275 N.W.2d at 545. 
123 136 Mich. App. 276, 355 N.W.2d 913 ~1984). 
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balance approach to MEPA. City of Portage involved the city's ef-
forts to prevent the removal of approximately seventy-four trees 
during a road construction project. Upholding the plaintiff's MEPA 
claim, the trial court permanently enjoined the removal of the trees, 
but its rationale came under attack in the appellate opinion: 
The trial court in the present case determined that a prima 
facie case was established by weighing the environmental risk 
of removing the trees against the good to be accomplished by 
their removal. This was error. The MEPA does not contemplate 
or permit a determination that a prima facie case has been made 
by the balancing of disadvantages against advantages of the 
defendant's proposed action. Rather, MEPA requires the court 
to first determine whether such proposed action rises to the level 
of an impairment or destruction of a natural resource so as to 
constitute an environmental risk. 124 
The court then proceeded to reverse the trial court's holding by 
stating that the removal of the trees, under the Kimberly Hills 
factors125 discussed in the next section, did not constitute impairment 
of a MEP A resource. 
The front-loaded equity balance spawned by the White Bear opin-
ion, and sternly renounced in City of Portage, is more than a "com-
mon law" fleshing out of statutory terms; it represents a judicial 
rewriting of the statutory schemes enacted by the states' respective 
legislatures. Such judicial lawmaking, if allowed to remain vital doc-
trine in Michigan and Minnesota could have important negative im-
plications for plaintiffs challenging major corporate or government 
polluters. 126 In addition to invoking the doctrine explicitly, courts in 
close cases may also allow equity balancing notions to influence their 
decision-making processes in subtle ways. 127 This type of submerged 
"front-loading" may lead to a significant erosion of plaintiffs' envi-
ronmental rights, and may constitute a significant windfall for de-
fendants seeking to avoid statutory liability. 
124 136 Mich. App. at 282-83,355 N.W.2d at 916. 
125 See infra note at notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
126 See Note, Balancing Test, supra note 103, at 277 n.40; but see Cramton, Citizen Suits 
in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise?, 25 AD. L. REV. 147 (1973). Professor Cramton 
fears that courts deciding environmental citizen suits will fail to differentiate between polluters 
of varying levels of social importance. The balancing of environmental and non-environmental 
objectives, he claims, should not be left to courts to accomplish in an ad hoc fashion, but 
should be done by more competent and far-sighted administrative bodies. 
127 See supra note 115. 
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B. The "Rarity" Balance in Determinations of Pollution, 
Impairment or Destruction 
465 
Despite the liberal definitions of "pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion" found in early cases under the public trust statutes,128 a recent 
string of Michigan opinions has substantially altered the content of 
these statutory terms. Beginning with West Michigan Environmen-
tal, a new form of balancing test, independent of the "front-loaded" 
equity balance, has emerged in MEP A cases. This new "rarity" 
balance weighs the relative scarcity of the resource sought to be 
protected against the magnitude of harm caused by the defendant's 
activities to determine whether the threshold level of impairment 
has been reached. This rarity balance, like the front-loaded equity 
balance, threatens to undermine the ability of MEPA plaintiffs to 
challenge a defendant's choice of alternatives on the merits. De 
minimus harm has never satisfied the Acts' prima facie require-
ments,129 but the minimal impairment threshold allowed the courts 
to remedy actual or threatened resource degradation even in local-
ized, low-profile controversies. Under rarity balancing, fewer MEPA 
claims will survive the summary judgment stage of litigation. 130 
The rarity balance, first enunciated in Kimberly Hills Neighbor-
hood Association v. Dian,131 weighs the rarity of the resource in 
question against the magnitude of harm to that resource threatened 
by the defendant's conduct. The "magnitude of harm" determination 
comprehends a weighing of three factors: the "nature of the defen-
dant's actions," the "characteristics of the resources involved," and 
the "type of property involved. "132 While the precise meanings of 
these factors have not yet been fully explored in the case law, 133 the 
cases have established a general hierarchy of resources under 
128 See MUCC, 90 Mich. App. at 105-06, 280 N.W.2d at 887. 
129 See Oscoda Chapter of PEE Action Comm., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 403 
Mich. 215, 268 N.W.2d 240 (1978); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich App. 237, 237 
N.W.2d 266 (1975); see also State by Skeie v. Minnkota Power Coop., Inc., 281 N.W.2d 372 
(Minn. 1979). 
130 See Cook v. Grand River Power Co., 131 Mich. App. 821, 346 N.W.2d 881 (1984). 
131 114 Mich. App. 495, 320 N.W.2d 668 (1982), tv. denied, 417 Mich. 1045 (1983). 
132Id. at 505. 
133 Some elaboration is found in City of Portage, 136 Mich. App. at 282, 355 N. W.2d at 916. 
The court of appeals cites as key factors under the Kimberly Hills test whether the resource 
is rare or unique, whether the resource is "easily replaceable," whether the defendant's 
conduct is likely to have a significant consequential effect on other resources, and whether 
the direct impact on animals or plants affects a "critical number." See infra notes 158-60 and 
accompanying text. 
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MEP A, with those resources considered comparatively "rare" or 
important receiving substantially more protection under the Act 
than common resources or species. l34 Thus, Michigan courts have 
come to adopt what might be termed a "sliding scale" approach to 
resource protection. 
The first suggestion of a rarity balance in MEP A caselaw appeared 
in the state supreme court's West Michigan Environmental opinion. 
Although the plaintiff in that case alleged adverse impacts to a wide 
variety of resources and species,135 the court's final opinion strongly, 
and almost exclusively, emphasized the adverse effects on the for-
est's rarest residents - an endangered elk herd: 
In light of the limited number of elk, the unique nature and 
location of this herd, and the apparently serious and lasting, 
though unquantifiable, damage that will result to the herd from 
the drilling of ten exploratory wells, we conclude that defen-
dants' conduct constitutes an impairment or destruction of a 
natural resource. 136 
The opinion's emphasis on the elk herd made the possibility of 
damage to the herd seem to be the sole motivation behind the 
supreme court's decision. Certainly, this was the signal sent to the 
press137 and the courts of appeals. 138 While the state supreme court's 
focus on resource rarity served the environmentalists well in West 
Michigan Environmental, it was to have negative repercussions for 
later MEPA plaintiffs. The West Mich1:gan Environmental decision 
added a new element to MEPA's prima facie case. By casting MEPA 
as an endangered resource act, the court prepared the way for a 
new approach to interpreting MEPA, one which would permit "rea-
134 114 Mich. App. at 508, 320 N. W.2d at 673. The court stated: "Since elk are extremely 
rare in Michigan, destruction of a relatively small number of elk will amount to an impairment. 
Destruction of the same number of a more common species would not necessarily amount to 
an impairment." Id. 
135 Among the species threatened by the proposed drilling were elk, bear, bobcat, and 
osprey. West Michigan Environmental, 405 Mich. at 755, 275 N.W.2d at 543. At trial, one of 
the plaintiff's wildlife experts also noted that a bald eagle had been sighted in the area of the 
proposed drilling. 405 Mich. at 755 n.3, 275 N.W.2d at 543 n.3. 
136Id. at 760, 275 N. W.2d at 545. 
137 One Michigan newspaper, the Detroit News, characterized the case as one of "oil versus 
elk." Price, Pigeon River Country State Forest - A Case of Oil Versus Elk, at 5 (unpublished 
paper in the files of Professor Zygmunt Plater, Boston College Law School). In another 
editorial, the Detroit News lambasted the state supreme court for defending the "scraggly" 
forest and its "ersatz" elk herd, claiming that the herd was "phony" and advocating the 
reversal of the decision by the United States Supreme Court. Pigeon River Justice, Detroit 
News, July 6, 1979, at 6A, col. 1. 
138 See Kimberly Hills, 114 Mich. App. at 508, 320 N.W.2d at 673. 
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sonable" impairment despite the legislature's explicit rejection of 
such a qualifying term. 139 The reasonableness of any impairment 
would depend on the relative abundance or scarcity of the resource 
and its ability to adapt to the defendant's challenged activity. 
The court of appeals crystallized the supreme court's statement 
into an explicit balancing test in the Kimberly Hills case. The re-
source complex at the center of the dispute was a four-acre parcel 
containing a seasonal holding pond, its surrounding vegetation and 
a host of common bird, animal and insect species. Of particular note 
was the presence of a pair of pheasants that used the parcel as a 
breeding ground. 140 The defendants sought to develop a series of 
one- and two-family residences on a nine-acre tract which included 
the disputed four acres that the plaintiff group sought to preserve. 
The city of Ann Arbor had at one time indicated an interest in 
purchasing the four-acre parcel for use as a public park, but no such 
transaction was ever consumated. 141 
The Kimberly Hills trial court decided the case in a manner con-
sonant with earlier MEPA cases, avoiding any rarity analysis and 
instead drafting an order that preserved the pond and established 
open access lanes for wildlife migrating across the property.142 Only 
limited development restrictions were placed on the remainder of 
the defendants' tract.143 As had courts in earlier MEPA cases, the 
trial court, functioning as a mediator between environmental and 
commercial interests, tailored an injunctive order that permitted 
development to go forward while forcing key environmental conces-
sions. 144 
The trial court's resolution of the Kimberly Hills controversy, 
however, was short-lived. The court of appeals struck down the trial 
court's order and dismissed the MEPA claim in an opinion that 
elaborated on West Michigan Environmental's rarity analysis. 145 The 
appeals court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their 
prima facie case; MEP A claims of pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion were to be decided in light of adverse impacts on statewide 
1:l9 See Note, Political Background, supra note 40, at 363-68. 
140 114 Mich. App. at 514, 320 N.W.2d at 676 (trial court opinion). 
141 Id. at 513,320 N.W.2d at 675-76. 
142 Id. at 520-22,320 N.W2d at 679-80. 
143 The defendants, in addition to being required to preserve the pond, a four-acre area 
around it, and the wildlife access lanes, were restrained from installing fences or concrete or 
asphalt driveways on the land. Id. at 521, 320 N.W.2d at 679. 
144 See Haynes, supra note 11, at 605. 
115 114 Mich. App. at 508-10,320 N.W.2d at 673-74. 
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"populations or ecological communities. "146 The Act, the court con-
cluded, was not designed to focus on "narrow local problems."147 
Such a narrow focus, the opinion added, would not only be contrary 
to the drafters' intent, but would also be unreasonably difficult to 
administer in the courtroom. 148 Thus, in weighing the availability of 
MEPA injunctions, courts handling MEPA suits should address re-
source controversies from a statewide, and not a local, orientation. 
Under this new rarity balance, the Kimberly Hills plaintiff asso-
ciation had little hope of success; none of the plant or animal species 
found on the parcel was in any way unique or unusual. The land's 
only unusual feature, the holding pond, did not affect any other 
adjoining watercourses or drainage systems. 149 Thus, development 
of the parcel would not cause the type of statewide environmental 
impact required to force judicial action. While the property was a 
distinctive local habitat area, that was no longer enough; where 
displaced wildlife was able to find alternative habitats, no judicial 
relief would now be forthcoming under MEP A.150 
Kimberly Hills was a classic example of a bad case that made 
bad law. The relative insignificance of the resources involved made 
it unlikely that the court of appeals would uphold the meticulously-
crafted trial court order. 151 Instead, the appellate court inartfully 
attempted to create a rule of reason to deter future MEPA plaintiffs 
from initiating small-scale actions. 152 While the case is currently an 
uncertain source of MEP A precedent, its effect could be disastrous 
if its holding were applied to more significant types of environmental 
146 114 Mich. App. at 507,320 N.W.2d at 673. 
147Id. 
148Id. at 507 n.1, 320 N.W.2d at 673 n.1; but see West Michigan Environmental, 405 Mich. 
at 706, 275 N.W.2d at 545. The state supreme court recognized that damage to the elk herd 
was "serious and lasting, though unquantifiable." See also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHI-
GAN, supra note 37, at 129 (firm scientific evidence not required to establish prima facie case 
under MEPA). 
Commentators have discerned a growing need for courts to intervene in situations where 
environmental threats are serious but merely anticipated. See Comment, Projected Environ-
mental Harm: Judicial Acceptance of a Concept of Uncertain Risk, 53 J. URB. L. 497 (1976). 
149 114 Mich. App. at 508-09, 320 N.W.2d at 674. 
150Id. at 510,320 N.W.2d at 674. 
151 The plaintiffs were, in fact, counselled against bringing the case for fear that it might 
create bad precedent. Interview with Professor Joseph Sax (Dec. 10, 1984); interview with 
Professor Zygmunt Plater (April 14, 1985) 
152 Not all observers of MEPA are convinced that the impact of Kimberly Hills on Michigan 
law is entirely negative. Professor Abrams argues that the case's holding may in fact deter 
potentia! MEPA plaintiffs from bringing suit against developers to obtain minor residential 
amenities. This function, he contends, is best left to local planning and zoning boards. Inter-
view with Professor Robert Abrams, (March 21, 1985). But see Slone, supra note 26, ~t 298. 
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damage. 153 Consequently, Michigan courts will have to clarify Kim-
berly Hills' precedential effect before MEPA's future as a litigation 
tool can be accurately assessed. 
Although the balancing test created by Kimberly Hills was rela-
tively stringent, it did not represent the ultimate extension of West 
Michigan Environmental's rarity analysis. Subsequent opinions in-
terpreting Kimberly Hills seemed to create even more demanding 
standards for MEPA impairment. In Cook v. Grand River Power 
CO.,154 the court of appeals seemed to take an even tougher approach 
to MEPA's prima facie case. In Cook, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
renewed operation of a hydroelectric dam by the defendant would 
cause flooding on their properties, damaging a number of common 
plant and animal species. 155 Affirming the trial court's dismissal of 
the MEPA claim, the appeals court addressed the dam's impact on 
wildlife: 
[t]he testimony presented indicated that if the dam were to 
operate again, certain plant life would be destroyed and certain 
animals displaced. There was no evidence that the plant life was 
unique or that the displaced animals would not have a suitable 
environment if the dam were operated. 156 
In light of the court's language in Cook, the plaintiff may have to 
make an even stronger showing than Kimberly Hills had indicated. 
While under Kimberly Hills, a loose balance was established weigh-
ing resource rarity against the harm caused by a defendant's con-
duct, Cook focuses, as did West Michigan Environmental, on the 
uniqueness of resources, and the ability of animal species to flee from 
the path of development. The language of the opinion seems to 
require a showing that migratory wildlife would have no alternative 
habitat, and that plant life was in some way unique before the 
plaintiff could make out his prima facie case. 157 
153 Professor Abrams claims that he has not observed Kimberly Hills to have a negative 
effect on air and water pollution cases, because under MEP A's terms, a "pollution" case need 
not involve the type of factors the Kimberly Hills court employed to reach a finding of 
"impairment." [d. However, Stevens v. Creek, 121 Mich. App. 503, 328 N.W.2d 672 (1982), 
seems to imply that the Kimberly Hills test may be applied to cases involving resource 
"destruction." In Stevens, the court of appeals remanded a case involving the destruction of 
trees to the trial court for application of Kimberly Hills' "impairment" factors. 
154 131 Mich. App. 821, 346 N.W.2d 881 (1984). 
155 [d. at 824,829,346 N.W.2d at 883,885. 
156 [d. at 829,346 N.W.2d at 885. 
157 It is difficult to harmonize the approach taken in a case like Cook with the court of 
appeals' opinion in Stevens v. Creek, 121 Mich. App, 503, 328 N.W.2d 672 (1982). In that case, 
the court of appeals remanded a MEPA suit to the circuit court with the instruction that the 
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Such a brief and conclusory statement as the one found in Cook 
may not represent any deliberate effort to increase the MEP A plain-
tiff's burden of proof, but its restrictive reading of Kimberly Hills 
is echoed by similar language in the court of appeals' City of Portage 
opinion. 158 The court in City of Portage held that where the plaintiff 
did not show that the trees in question were "unique or irreplacable" 
or that their removal "would have any significant consequential effect 
on other natural resources," the court would not enjoin their destruc-
tion. 159 The court also observed that the number of trees removed 
was "not critical" from an environmental standpoint. 160 
Lastly, while the court observed that any adverse effects caused 
by the trees' destruction should be cured by replanting, its restric-
tive reading of the prima facie case left it unable to order such relief. 
Clearly, courts following City of Portage could no longer use MEP A 
widely as an environmental planning tool, even in the types of cases 
which would have warranted MEP A relief just a few years earlier. 161 
If a showing of "uniqueness," "irreplacability," lack of alternative 
habitat or "critical" damage to resource populations will be required 
trial court permit the plaintiff to offer expert testimony on the "pollution, impairment or 
destruction" resulting from the defendant's cutting and removal of a small number of trees 
from her property. One possible explanation is that Stevens merely involved the propriety of 
an offer of evidence, not a determination of pollution, impairment or destruction. However, 
the court's leniency in the context of a decidedly "local" problem has caused some confusion. 
See Slone, supra note 26, at 282. Another explanation is possible. Stevens involved a trespass, 
an invasion of another's property rights, while Kimberly Hills and Cook involved proposed 
uses of the defendant's own property rights. (The defendant in Cook had valid flowage 
easements over the properties of the plaintiffs, see 131 Mich. App. at 825-28, 346 N. W.2d at 
883-84.) Thus, a new wrinkle in MEPA doctrine may be emerging, offering individuals a 
limited right to impair resources on their own property without the threat of MEPA sanctions. 
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03, subd. 1: 
[Nlo action shall be allowable hereunder for acts taken by a person on land leased or 
owned by said person pursuant to a license issued by the owner of the land to said 
person which do not and can not reasonably be expected to pollute, impair or destroy 
any other air, water, land, or other natural resources located within the state, .... 
This development, if carried to fruition, could have negative implications for the future of the 
public trust statutes. Such a common law "private impairment" exemption would carry laws 
like MEPA closer to the "sic utere" rule embodied in traditional nuisance law. A contrary 
development would be mandated if the law, as it seems to have been, was intended to give 
the public rights to intervene as "guardians" of the resources themselves in which they hold 
trust interests. See Olson, Experiment, supra note 73, at 181; Stone, Should Trees Have 
Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 465 n.53 
(1972). 
158 136 Mich. App. 276, 355 N.W.2d 913 (1984). 
159Id. at 283,355 N.W.2d at 916. 
160 Id. 
161 Replanting has been a long-accepted equitable remedy under MEPA, see Eyde v. Mich-
igan, 82 Mich. App. 531, 539-40, 267 N.W.2d 442, 447 (1978). 
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of future MEP A plaintiffs, the withdrawal of courts from even more 
types of resource disputes may be inevitable. 
The most recent MEP A case decided by the court of appeals more 
clearly illustrates the threat to environmental enforcement inherent 
in the Kimberly Hills test. In Rush v. Sterner,162 the plaintiffs, like 
those in Cook, challenged the defendants' plans to rehabilitate an 
unused dam in order to generate hydroelectric power. They asserted 
that if the dam were to be operated, it would flood their land, alter 
the character of a local trout stream, Prarie Creek, damage trees 
and vegetation, and adversely affect the local flood plain. Prarie 
Creek was stocked with trout by the state Department of Natural 
Resources, and represented one of only two such trout streams in 
the county. 163 
The court of appeals agreed that the impoundment of the stream 
would have a number of harmful effects, but nevertheless held that 
the plaintiffs had failed to make out a prima facie case of MEP A 
impairment. The changes in the speed, temperature, and rate of 
sedimentation of Prarie Creek would likely lead to the trout's de-
mise, but the court refused to issue a MEPA injunction because, 
while the trout were admittedly "unique" in Ionia County, they were 
common in the state, existed in other streams in the general geo-
graphical area of the county, and were only able to survive in the 
stream because of the "stringent management efforts" of the D NR. 164 
Without this human help, the court observed, the trout would be 
unable to compete with other fish species. 165 The court also failed to 
consider significant the dam's impacts on trees and vegetation, which 
were not unique or difficult to replace, or the area's flood plain, 
which the court conceded would become "more of a permanent 
swamp."166 
Clearly, Kimberly Hills is growing by increments. After Rush, 
wildlife maintained by resource management programs may be ac-
corded even less protection than those species which do not require 
such assistance. Rush also deals a significant blow to the nascent 
"local impact" standard167 first cited in the City of Portage opinion, 
even while claiming to support it.168 With each new MEP A case 
162 143 Mich. App. 672, 373 N.W.2d 183 (1985). 
163 Id. at 679-80,373 N.W.2d at 186. 
164 Id. at 680,373 N.W.2d at 187. 
165Id. 
166 Id., 373 N.W.2d at 186-87. 
167 See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. 
16>< 143 Mich. App. at 680 n.1, 373 N.W.2d at 187 n.l. 
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decided by the court of appeals, the evolution of ever-stricter read-
ings of Kimberly Hills threatens to undermine still further citizens' 
environmental protection powers. 
The doctrinal innovations wrought by West Michigan Environ-
mental and Kimberly Hills have engendered controversy among 
commentators. Some commentators have described the Kimberly 
Hills opinion as a laudable effort to balance the state's economic and 
environmental objectives. 169 Others, however, have viewed the rar-
ity balance critically.170 These critics point out that the heightened 
impairment standard is inconsistent with the Act's legislative 
history l7l and prior caselaw development,172 and does little to guide 
future courts regarding the appropriateness of MEP A injunctions. 173 
During the debate surrounding MEPA's passage, a number of 
efforts to weaken the statute's language were rejected. One of these 
would have qualified the pollution, impairment or destruction stan-
dard by requiring that such degradation be "unreasonable."174 By 
rejecting such a modification, the legislature clearly evidenced the 
intent that something less than a common law nuisance should serve 
to trigger the Act's provisions. MEPA is not simply designed to 
remedy the type of "unreasonable" intrusions on resources that the 
common law itself could adequately remedy. The law was meant to 
force behavioral changes, to create an incentive for government 
agencies and private enterprises to structure their conduct around 
conservation objectives. Developers were to be forced, Professor 
Sax has written, to consider alternatives to even the most common 
types of activities affecting environmental quality.175 This goal may 
not be attained if MEP A is henceforth to apply only in exceptional 
circumstances. 
MEPA is, above all, a citizen suit statute. 176 It is hardly surprising: 
that citizen suits often involve distinctly local issues affecting local-
169 Favre, Protecting a Natural Treasure: Michigan'S Upper Peninsula, 62 MICH. B.J. 304 
(1983). 
170 See Abrams, supra note 62, at 132-34; Olson, Experiment, supra note 73, at 183; Pratt, 
Natural Resources and Environmental Law, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 871, 878-80 (1983); Slone,. 
supra note 26, at 281-82. 
171 See Abrams, supra note 62, at 115. 
172 See id. at 114 & nn.50-54; Slone, supra note 26, at 281 & n.74. 
173 See Pratt, supra note 171, at 880. 
174 See Note, Political Background, supra note 40, at 363-68. 
175 See supra note 74. Abrams sees this focus on developmental alternatives, not controver·· 
sies about the extent of environmental harm, to be the logical core of the act. See Abrams, 
supra note 62, at 117. See also Sax & Dimento, supra note 93, at 9. 
176 See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 11, at 1; Trumbull, Private Environmental Legal Action, 
7 U.S.F.L. REV. 27 (1972). 
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ized resource bases.177 If MEPA is to remain an important tool to 
environmental litigants, it must be able to respond to these types of 
situations. Not only does the Kimberly Hills standard threaten to 
force judges out of many local controversies,178 the heightened prima 
facie case requirements may also serve to place heavier financial 
burdens on the underfinanced citizen plaintiffs who are able to meet 
the tougher rarity test. 179 One logical solution to the problems posed 
by these recent judicial developments is the abandonment of the 
Kimberly Hills standard in favor of one examining impacts on an 
resource's local user base. 18o There is already some judicial support 
for this locally-focused approach to MEPA impairment. 181 
Currently, it is unclear where courts will draw the line denoting 
significant state- or area-wide impairment. As a result, pollution or 
overdevelopment may have a "nibbling effect" on resources, un-
checked by potential MEP A liability. 182 If plaintiffs are forced to wait 
for resources to be critically threatened before bringing suit, 
MEPA's most important aspect will be sacrificed and its behavioral 
incentives will disappear. MEPA may, under those conditions, simply 
be too little too late. 
A problem similar to the "common" resource dilemma has arisen 
in MEP A challenges to zoning decisions. Recent caselaw seems to 
indicate that disputes arising at the zoning stage may not be the 
proper subjects of MEPA suits because the act of zoning does not 
177 Commentators have noted the tendency of ad hoc citizen group plaintiffs to crystallize 
around decidedly local issues. See Sax and Conner, supra note 24, at 1008 n.21; Sax and 
Dimento, supra note 93, at 7-8; Haynes, supra note 11, at 595, 672; Slone, supra note 26, at 
275. Indeed, it has been suggested that intervention by statewide environmental groups is 
rare because only those locally affected by resource decisions, in many cases, are sufficiently 
motivated to sue. [d. at 315. 
Professor Sax has described MEPA as "a tool for education and institution-building on the 
local level." Sax & Dimento, supra note 93, at 5. 
178 See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text. 
179 See Abrams, supra note 62, at 119; Pratt, supra note 171, at 880. 
180 See Abrams, supra note 62, at 133-34. 
181 See City of Portage, 136 Mich. App. at 283 n.2, 355 N. W.2d at 916 n.2 (removal of trees 
has insignificant environmental impact from "either a statewide or local viewpoint"). Professor 
Abrams points out an inconsistency between Kimberly Hills and other areas of standing 
doctrine. Traditionally, when judging the merits of a standing claim, courts have looked at 
the concreteness of the plaintiff's injury; mere abstract concern would not be enough to gain 
standing in a court of law. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The closer a 
plaintiff was to the harm, and the more intimately he was tied to the controversy by his use 
of the damaged resource, the easier it would be for him to sue. Under the Kimberly Hills 
standard, the courts would have to rule against plaintiffs who suffered direct, tangible injuries 
to their enjoyment of local resources, while granting equitable relief to those suing for more 
abstract injuries to statewide populations. See Abrams, supra note 62, at 133 & n.204. 
182 See Abrams, supra note 62, at 133 & n.199. 
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itself impair the environment. The prospective MEP A plaintiff may 
thus have to consider not only the rarity or regional importance of 
the resources he is seeking to protect, but, at least in the zoning 
context, the timing of his suit as well. 
In Committee for Sensible Land Use v. Garfield Township, 18.~ the 
plaintiffs challenged the rezoning of a 36-acre parcel from residential 
to shopping center use. The parcel was to be the site of a planned 
commercial complex to be known as "Buffalo Mall. "184 While it ac-
knowledged that the rezoning of land could "ultimately affect natural 
resources,"185 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling 
that zoning alone did not impair resources within the meaning of 
MEPA. Resources could be adequately protected, the court added, 
by a MEP A suit brought at a later stage of land use regulation, such 
as the issuance of building permits. 186 
Interestingly, the court dismissed a line of Washington zoning 
cases cited by the plaintiffs in which zoning challenges were permit-
ted. 187 This line of cases took a different approach than that ulti-
mately adopted by the court of appeals: they permitted plaintiffs to 
contest rezoning when such rezoning was directed toward a specific 
project, but denied judicial relief when no particular project moti-
vated the challenged zoning amendment. 188 
One recent article on MEP A has suggested that Michigan courts 
adopt this rule in MEPA cases involving zoning amendments. 189 The 
"specific project" rule would seem to be a logical outgrowth of 
MEPA's language and purpose. The Act does not merely encompass 
past conduct that has harmed the environment; it also applies to 
activities which are "likely to" harm resources in the future. 190 Pre-
vention is a major concern of the statute. If plaintiffs must wait for 
damage to occur before bringing suit, they may already be faced 
183 124 Mich. App. 559, 335 N.W.2d 216 (1983). 
184 [d. at 563,335 N.W.2d at 217. 
185 [d., 335 N.W.2d at 218. 
186 [d. at 565, 335 N. W.2d at 218. The case's holding has been criticized, however, as 
inconsistent with the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in West Michigan Environmental. 
Although the court was unsure about which stage of the permit procedure was being challenged 
in West Michigan Environmental, it allowed the plaintiffs to challenge the proposed explo-
ratory drilling. See Olson, Experiment, supra note 73, at 183. 
187 See Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980); Save A Valuable 
Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978); Ullock v. City of 
Bremerton, 17 Wash. App. 573, 565 P.2d 1179 (1977). 
188 Barrie, 93 Wash. at 860, 613 P.2d at 1158. 
189 Slone, supra note 26, at 304. 
190 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(203)(1) (1980); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN, supra 
note 37, at 130-31. 
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with a disastrous fait accompli by the time adequate injunctive relief 
is forthcoming. 
When a specific project is on the drawing board, little is accom-
plished by forcing plaintiffs to delay their suits. The uncertainty of 
environmental harm, and the difficulty of gauging that harm, which 
is so much a concern in MEPA cases, 191 are not nearly as troublesome 
when definite plans have been drawn. In such cases, courts will most 
likely be able to judge environmental impacts with reasonable ac-
curacy. Additionally, deferral of MEP A suits may cause developers' 
costs to mount, or permit a project to gain public support and ad-
ministrative momentum. If MEP A is genuinely to influence a devel-
oper's search for alternative strategies, citizens must be able to 
inject its sanctions into the planning process. In this way, environ-
mental accommodations can be reached at the earliest possible time 
and in the most efficient possible manner. 192 
C. The Taking Issue 
The taking193 question, one of the most puzzling in all of legal 
scholarship,194 represents another issue which has circumscribed the 
effects of the public trust citizen suit statutes in the courts. The 
issue has been clearly presented only once, in the Minnesota case 
Powderly v. Erickson. 195 In Powderly, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
stated that MERA, in certain circumstances, could work a taking of 
191 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
192 Olson, Experiment, supra note 73, at 184. 
193 Although, for the sake of convenience, this Comment denotes fourteenth amendment 
challenges as "taking" issues, it is important to note that in recent years a separate strain of 
legal theory has developed that espouses substantive due process as the proper theory under 
which to challenge the constitutional validity of state legislative enactments. See Kelso, 
Substantive Due Process as a Limit on Police Power Regulatory Takings, 20 WILLAMETI'E 
L. REV. 1 (1984). The distinctions are that under the "takings" clause, damages are automatic, 
while a court finding a due process violation has discretion to award damages on other types 
of declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. at 4. Also, those commentators who favor substantive 
due process claim that the takings clause limits the government's power of eminent domain, 
and thus is not applicable where regulatory acts are challenged. Id. at 5. The separate theories 
were argued before the Supreme Court in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), but the case was instead decided on 
exhaustion of remedies grounds. Despite the conceptual differences between the theories, the 
Court strongly suggested that their analysis of a due process claim would be substantially 
similar to that involved in a taking claim. Id. at 3122-24. 
194 Professor Haar has stated that defining the parameters of a regulatory "taking" was the 
"lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark." C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 
766 (3d ed. 1976), quoted in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank 
of Johnson City. 105 S. Ct. at 3124 n.17 (1985). 
195 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979), rev'd, 301 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1981). 
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property in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 196 The taking 
issue has also been raised, but never authoritatively decided, in 
Michigan. 197 Although courts seem reluctant to decide whether public 
trust injunctions work unconstitutional takings of private property, 
the question will continue to cast a shadow over the citizen suit laws 
and the plaintiffs who may seek to invoke them. 
l. Powderly v. Erickson 
In the first Powderly case (Powderly I), the state supreme court 
examined a controversy over the proposed demolition of two historic 
row houses in the city of Red Wing. The owners planned to use the 
land to expand parking facilities for a group of stores they also 
owned. A group of local citizens obtained a MERA injunction in the 
trial court that permanently enjoined the defendants from demolish-
ing the structures. The court held that the defendants had failed to 
rebut the plaintiffs' showing of pollution, impairment or destruction, 
and, significantly, that no evidence indicated that the injunction was 
a taking without just compensation. 198 
The supreme court's Powderly I affirmance at first appears to 
support a preservationist reading of MERA. The opinion draws from 
such early MERA cases as County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bry-· 
son,199 the principle that, once a prima facie case is made out, it is 
the resource that is to be given primary consideration by the court. 200 
MERA's protections are only to be lifted in the face of truly unusual 
factors or community disruptions of an extraordinary magnitude. 201 
The Powderly I opinion, however, ultimately seems to say two 
different things. While the court discusses the taking issue at some 
length, citing the United States Supreme Court's pro-government 
holding in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,2O:~ 
and ultimately concluding that no taking had been proven, the opin-· 
ion then begins to change its tone. The court first notes that it would 
be far more "fair' and more efficient"203 for the state or city to 
condemn the properties, then adds that a MERA injunction could 
not force renovation or the indefinite preservation of the homes 
196 301 N.W.2d at 326. 
197 See infra notes 223-39 and accompanying text. 
198 285 N.W.2d at 90. 
199 309 Minn. 178,243 N.W.2d 316 (1976). 
200 285 N.W.2d at 88. 
201Id. 
202 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
208 285 N.W.2d at 90. 
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without violating the fourteenth amendment. Finally, the opmIOn 
concludes in a fashion almost diametrically opposed to the pro-
MERA tone with which it began: "[ w ]here control or acquisition of 
property is for the benefit of many, it makes sense that the cost of 
the control or acquisition should be borne by all of the taxpayers 
and not the few directly affected. "204 
On remand, the trial court modified its permanent injunction. The 
new injunction could be dissolved if, within three months, the houses 
were not "sold, renovated, or acquired by eminent domain."205 After 
the three month waiting period expired, the defendants moved to 
have the injunction lifted. The reSUlting litigation led back to the 
state supreme court and the decision in Powderly II. 
While the supreme court upheld the injunction, it modified it to 
last only to the end of the legislative session. 206 The opinion's lan-
guage strongly suggested that the application of MERA to the de-
fendants' houses lay beyond the permissible scope of the state's 
police power and could render the state liable for the payment of 
just compensation if the MERA injunction was not ultimately dis-
solved. 207 In the future, the state or concerned citizens would pos-
sibly be forced to purchase properties they wished to conserve. 
A strict reading of MERA's terms would make the case a fairly 
simple one. The homes were "historic" resources covered by MERA. 
Plaintiffs established a prima facie case of threatened destruction, 
and the defendants failed to rebut that case. Thus, the focus should 
have shifted to the environmentally-weighted balancing test present 
in MERA's affirmative defense provisions. 208 In order to prevail, the 
defendants would have had to show that no feasible or prudent 
alternative to the demolition existed, and that the value to the public 
welfare of increased parking was great enough to outweigh the 
state's concern for historical resources. Economic considerations 
alone would not be sufficient to establish an affirmative defense 
204 Id. at 90-91. 
205 301 N.W.2d at 325. 
206 Id. at 327. The court goes on: 
In the event the legislature takes no corrective action at this session, respondents 
may apply to the trial court for an order dissolving the injunction, unless by that 
time appellants have been able to propose and implement some other remedy appro-
priate to the equitable jurisdiction of the court. 
Id. The court suggests that, if government funds are not available, an appropriate unit of 
government could acquire the houses by eminent domain, with citizens' groups compensating 
the property owners. Id. at 327 n.3. 
207 Id. at 326. 
208 See supra note 64. 
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under the Act.209 This reading of the statutes is logically consistent 
with the theory behind the citizen suit laws: when conduct threatens 
protected resources, it should be enjoined until less harmful como. 
promises can be engineered. In that way, all citizens could be reo. 
quired to structure their activities around environmental, and in 
MERA's case, historical, preservation. 
The Powderly II opinion ignored the possibility of profitable al-· 
ternative uses for the properties consistent with the state's historic: 
preservation interests. The court's earlier opinion indicated that 
renovation and rental could have proven successful, due to the 
"tight" rental market then existing in Red Wing. 210 Even the second 
Powderly opinion admitted that "reasonable" developers were still 
negotiating with the defendants for the rights to purchase and reno. 
ovate the homes.211 
Judicial interpretations of "feasible and prudent alternative" 
strongly favor resource preservation;212 the possibility of renovation 
or sale would seem to cancel out any chance of proving the affirma-· 
tive MERA defense. Established principles of taking law also counsel 
that the mere inability to use property as one sees fit is not a taking, 
provided an owner still retains an economically viable use and does 
not suffer too great an infringement on "reasonable investment·· 
backed expectations."213 A MERA injunction prohibiting demolition 
would impose no affirmative obligations on the defendants, but state 
historic preservation laws imposing such obligations have been held 
constitutional. 214 The taking question is frequently a close one, but 
the Powderly court's use of constitutional doctrine to break a par·· 
209 See supra note 69. 
210 285 N.W.2d at 89. 
211 301 N.W.2d at 326. The court expressly alludes to the developers' apparent expectations 
of a reasonable rate of return on the row houses. [d. 
212 See Olsonite Corp., 79 Mich. App. at 703-06,263 N.W.2d at 796-97; PEER, 266 N.W.2d 
at 868. 
213 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 
136. 
214 See Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 90fi 
(1985); Note, Affirmative Maintenance Provisions in Historic Preservation: A Taking of 
Property?, 34 S.C.L. REV. 713, 729--30 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Affirmative Main· 
tenance]. The author suggests that an anti-demolition or affirmative maintenance law is 
constitutional unless it requires "extensive repairs" to a building having "no reasonable future 
use." The "reasonableness of future use" inquiry would involve an examination of both reha-
bilitation and resale alternatives, see Lafeyette Park Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, 
599 S.W.2d 61, 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). The author concludes that an historic preservation 
statute or ordinance with an affirmative maintenance provision should only fail a constitutional 
takings challenge when the regulated structure possesses "little or no potential use." 
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ticularly troublesome impasse215 is contrary to the spirit of MERA 
and increasingly liberal judicial attitudes toward historic preserva-
tion. 216 
The historic preservation component of MERA functions in an 
unusual manner, which may have left it particularly vulnerable to 
constitutional attack. The law establishes no historic districts or 
regions, and creates no single governmental body charged with enu-
merating historic structures. 217 Only the piecemeal application of 
MERA in individual cases by private or governmental plaintiffs 
determines which resources are "historic" for the purposes of the 
Act. Laws establishing historic districts have survived constitutional 
challenges due to the "reciprocal benefits" they may offer regulated 
property owners.218 The creation of the historic district often occa-
sions a rise in property values, and this rise may offset the restric-
tions placed upon regulated property owners.219 Here, however, it 
is unclear whether the two row houses were located near other 
historic structures. From the tone of the court's opinion, it appears 
that they stood in relative isolation. 
On a more general level, historic resources simply may not partake 
of the "public" character which makes natural resources so clearly 
part of the public trust. 220 Intuitively, historic resources may not 
seem appropriate subjects of state trusteeship. The state's police 
power may not be as appropriate a regulator of historic homes as it 
is of streams or meadows, and courts interpreting laws like MERA 
may view their application to man-made structures with more skep-
ticism. 
The ultimate costibenefit rationale of Powderly is troubling. The 
same notion, that any public "benefit" acquired at the expense of 
215 In Powderly, the defendants staunchly refused to negotiate with potential buyers. The 
court, in somewhat cryptic terms, chose to uphold the Powderly's "right to refuse to negotiate" 
over the state's power to protect historical resources. 301 N.W.2d at 326. 
216 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107-08. 
217 The Penn Central case involved just such an administrative body, see id. at 110. 
218 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134--35; Note, Affirmative Maintenance, supra note 214, 
at 726. The Penn Central discussion of reciprocity is particularly enlightening because it 
involves an historic preservation law that did not create historic districts, but applied randomly 
to landmarks as they were designated by the statutorily-created Landmarks Commission. The 
Supreme Court supported the New York City Council's claim that the city's Landmarks 
Preservation Law, N. Y. ADMIN. CODE ch.8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976), conferred reciprocal benefits 
on "all New York citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving the quality 
of life in the city as a whole." 438 U.S. at 134. 
219 See Note, Affirmative Maintenance, supra note 214, at 726; see also Figarsky v. Historic 
Dist. Comm'n of Norwich, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d 163 (1976). 
220 See supra note 22. 
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private property owners must be paid for with public funds, lay at 
the heart of a number of environmental cases whose opinions ques-
tioned the state's police power over natural resources. 221 In other 
words, it is conceivable that the Powderly opinion may fuel the 
arguments of those challenging public trust citizen suit laws in en-
vironmental contexts. 
2. Kimberly Hills 
The taking issue was briefed, but not decided, in the Kimberly 
Hills case, and an examination of the parties' arguments sheds some 
light on the probable constitutionality of MEPA injunctions. The 
conflict presented in Kimberly Hills involved a fundamental dispute 
over the appropriate characterization of the Act. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the trial court's injunction was not an unconstitutional 
taking, and relied on the state's ability to regulate land use and 
environmental matters under an expansive police power.222 The de-
fendants, however, sought to differentiate legitimate police power 
exercises from quasi-eminent domain laws that attempted to extract 
public benefits without compensating landowners.223 This latter type 
of statute, they asserted, fell outside the realm of permissible police 
power regulation, since the laws took property for public use224 
without paying just compensation. 
221 See, e.g., Maine v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 771 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement 
Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). 
= See Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 9-14; Appellees' Citation of Additional Authority at 
1-3; Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. App. 495, 320 N.W.2d 668 (1982) 
(discussion of the recently-decided Agins case). 
Another argument advanced for the constitutionality of MEPA by both commentators and 
appellees asserted that there could be no taking of "property," since the landowner had no 
property right which could be taken. Property rights, for the purposes of "taking" jurispru-
dence, are defined by the state. Since article IV, § 52, of the state constitution mandates that 
the legislature protect natural resources, a duty fulfilled by the passage of MEPA, there could 
be no "right" to pollute which could be taken by a MEPA injunction. See ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW IN MICHIGAN, supra note 37, at 157; Slone, supra note 26, at 306 n.216; see also Just v. 
Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N. W.2d 761 (1972) (no taking resulting from wetlands 
zoning ordinance; landowner has no right to fill wetland). 
223 See Brief for Appellants at 21-27, Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. 
App. 495, 320 N. W.2d 668 (1982). 
224 At the time the case was decided, Michigan had adopted the view that a "public use" 
required that the public have an actual right to physically use the property. See Brief for 
Appellants at 24, Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. App. 495,320 N. W.2d 
668 (1982) (citing Livonia Township School Dist. v. Wilson, 339 Mich. 454, 64 N.W.2d 563 
(1954); Lakehead Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Dehn, 340 Mich. 25, 64 N.W.2d 903 (1954); Board of 
Health of Portage v. Jacob Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533,49 N.W. 894 (1891). The trial court's 
injunction gave the public no right to enter the appellant's property. See Brief For Appellants, 
supra at 24. 
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The defendants sought to draw an analogy between MEPA and 
statutes restricting development on future public parkland. In Mary-
land National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Chad-
wick,225 a statute permitted a city planning board to place land 
proposed for park acquisition in "reservation" for up to three years. 
No development would be permitted during that three-year period. 
The Maryland Supreme Court held that when a law imposed restric-
tions on private land "in order to create a public benefit," rather 
than to forestall a "public harm," the law worked a compensible 
taking. 226 This is the same type of costlbenefit theory that lay behind 
a number of cases invalidating wetlands regulations. 227 
In response to the defendants' "public benefit" arguments, the 
plaintiff association asserted the legitimacy of the state's police 
power exercise. Of central importance to the plaintiff's argument 
was Agins v. City of Tiburon, 228 one of the most recent of the United 
States Supreme Court's land use opinions. The controversy in Agins 
centered around five acres of unimproved land overlooking San 
Francisco Bay. Subsequent to the Agins' purchase of the land, the 
city adopted zoning ordinances limiting the density of future resi-
dential development on the property.229 In passing on the constitu-
225 286 Md. 1, 405 A.2d 241 (1979). 
226 286 Md. at 11, 405 A.2d at 246, citing Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Sanitation Comm'n, 
400 F. Supp. 1369, 1382 (D. Md. 1975). 
227 See supra note 194. For a discussion of the "public benefit" analysis in the wetlands 
context, see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 155-63 (1973). An 
important recurring rationale in taking cases has been that the state may not use its regulatory 
power to appropriate land for proprietary public uses, see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking 
Without Just Compensation, 58 VA. L. REV. 876, 8iol8-90 (1972). The distinction between a 
public benefit and a public harm has been elusive, however, particularly in environmental 
cases where elements of both are present, see id. at 890. A later rule proposed by Sax, one 
seemingly consistent with MEPA's notions of public environmental rights, would permit the 
government to regulate private land uses in cases where private ownership rights and more 
diffuse public rights to environmental quality come into conflict. See Sax, Takings, Private 
Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). The costs of regulation would be 
imposed on private owners to create incentives for developing new technologies and alternative 
land use strategies. MEPA seems to fit conceptually with Sax's later conception of taking law, 
since the "costs" of environmental quality are intended to stimulate new approaches to envi-
ronmentally harmful activity. 
228 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
229 The zoning amendments created an "RPD-1" zoning classification for the plaintiffs' prop-
erty. This zone permitted only one-family dwellings, accessory buildings and open space. The 
plaintiffs would have been permitted to build between one and five single-family dwellings on 
the tract. [d. at 257. 
Appellants sought to distinguish Agins by contending that, since MEP A was not a zoning 
ordinance, it was not entitled to the type of deferential treatment usually accorded zoning 
enactments. See Appellants' Response to Appellee's Citation of Additional Authority at 2, 
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tionality of the density restrictions, Justice Powell articulated a 
takings test strongly weighted in favor of state environmental and 
land use controls: "the application of a general zoning law to partic-
ular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically 
viable use of his land . . . . "230 
The Court held that the zoning amendments in question advanced 
a legitimate police power objective, the protection of local residents 
from "the ill effects of urbanization. "231 Since the ordinances permit-
ted limited residential development, they neither prevented "the 
best use of appellant's land," nor extinguished "a fundamental at-
tribute of ownership. "232 In addition, since other residents were also 
affected by the ordinances, an unfair share of the regulatory burden 
did not fall on the plaintiffs; the public shared in both the benefits 
and the burdens flowing from the law. 233 The Court also added that 
state action in defense of "scenic beauty" and the controlled use of 
natural resources was constitutionally defensible when the landown-
er's reasonable investment expectations were preserved. 
The Kimberly Hills defendants would clearly have been fighting 
an uphill battle in pursuing their taking claim. A variety of state 
and local land use regulations designed to advance a wide range of 
valid state purposes had already survived constitutional attack, de-
spite the often harsh consequences for regulated landowners. 234 
Agins offered states and municipalities powerful new support for 
their regulation of environmental hazards; environmental protection 
is now firmly established as a legitimate state interest. 
MEPA is a law of general application, covering all citizens, orga-
nizations and governmental entities within the state. The Dions also 
clearly retained profitable use of their land, even with the Kimberly 
Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. App. 495, 320 N.W.2d 668 (1982). This 
argument, however, is not satisfying. MEPA admittedly functions in a similar fashion to 
zoning ordinances in land use cases. Slone, supra note 26, at 301; see also Skillern, Environ-
mental Legislation: An Alternative to Minimum Acreage Zoning, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 
(1974). Such cases are among the most frequently brought under the act, see Slone, supra 
note 26, at 275; Sax & Dimento, supra note 93, at 8. In fact, the appellants themselves 
challenged the application of MEPA to their land as an unlawful amendment of the City or 
Village Zoning Act of 1921, see Brief for Appellants at 28-33, Kimberly Hills Neighborhood 
Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. App. 495, 320 N.W.2d 668 (1982). 
230 447 U.S. at 260. 
231 [d. at 262. 
""'2 [d. 
233 [d. 
234 For a comprehensive survey of state and local land use regulation, and the current state 
of taking jurisprudence in the area, see D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW (1982). 
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Hills trial court's injunction in place. 235 Contrarily, the defendants' 
arguments seemed to offer uncompelling semantics; the characteri-
zation of resource preservation as a "public benefit" and not the 
prevention of a "public harm," even where land is kept in a park-
like state, is a conclusion that seems to contradict a lingering strain 
of judicial reasoning in environmental opinions. 236 
Although the diminution in property value suffered by a property 
owner must vary from case to case, it is unlikely that MEPA would 
deprive him of all "economically viable use." Such an extreme de-
privation would trigger the Act's affirmative defense provisions, at 
least in theory.237 Also, the high degree of flexibility given to judges 
in fashioning equitable relief under MEP A would enable a court to 
preserve for the defendant the maximum permissible level of use. 
Finally, given the growing public awareness of environmental reg-
235 Appellees even hinted, in their brief to the court of appeals, that the appellants' property 
value may even have increased, as in the case of historic districts, due to the preservation of 
the natural areas. Brief for Appellees at 21, Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 
Mich. App. 495, 320 N. W.2d 668 (1982). Appellees estimated that, if developed under the trial 
court's MEPA order, the property would have grossed around $4.8 million. Id. Appellants 
sought to base their taking claim on the total development ban placed on the four-acre tract. 
Under Penn Central, however, it would be impermissible for the court to divide the tract for 
the purposes of its taking analysis. 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
236 See Brecciaroli v. Commissioner of Envtl. Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975); 
Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984); Sibson v. State, 115 
N.H. 124,336 A.2d 239 (1975); Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768; but see Burrows v. 
City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981) (limiting holding of Sibson to unique or 
vanishing resources such as wetlands; ordinary woodland not the proper subject of conser-
vation zoning). For a more theoretical view of the rise of state police power, see Sax, Some 
Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983) [hereinafter cited 
as Sax, Some Thoughts]. Professor Sax suggests that society is turning away from private 
property as a means of advancing collective social goals, and embracing instead more pUblicly-
oriented "nonexclusive" rights concepts. This shift, in turn, has led to more environmentally-
sensitive judicial decision-making. Citizens may now, Professor Lazarus has observed, have 
developed "new property" expectations in today's extensive governmental resource regulation, 
and these expectations may be in the process of displacing some forms of traditional private 
property rights. See Lazarus, supra note 13, at 698-702. 
237 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN, supra note 37, at 156; Slone, supra note 26, 
at 305-06; Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 14-15. 
Thus, MEP A courts may regulate private land use only to the point that a "reasonable use" 
remains. Other commentators have proposed regulatory schemes that would theoretically 
permit the state to constitutionally regulate land even beyond the "reasonable use" level. See 
Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking 
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1049-52 (1975). Professor 
Costonis proposes that courts judge a challenged state regulation against a spectrum of land 
use intensities. When the regulation restricts land use below the "Reasonable Beneficial Use" 
level, the government would be allowed to pay "compensation," in cash or other "marketwor-
thy alternatives" such as transferrable development rights, for the difference between the 
land's value as regulated and its value with a reasonable beneficial use. Id. at 1052. 
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ulation, it may be argued that the scope of a landowner's "reason-
able" development expectations may indeed be decreasing over 
time.238 Thus, given the current trend in land use law forged by the 
Supreme Court, and the careful crafting of MEP A's provisions, a 
constitutional challenge to the statute, and those of its kind, should 
ultimately prove unsuccessful. Such a result would affirm the states' 
power to regulate environmentally-threatening conduct through the 
courts under the sensitive and innovative provisions of public trust-
based citizen suit statutes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The enactment of MEPA in 1970 was a cause for great concern in 
the legal community. Skeptics feared the the statute would clog the 
courts with environmental suits, opening a "Pandora's box"239 of 
frivolous litigation. They also feared the disruption of administrative 
agency functions, and the confusion which would be created in the 
courts by vague concepts of "public trust." Studies of MEPA, how-
ever, have shown these fears groundless; MEP A suits have com-
prised only a small percentage of civil actions,24o and courts have 
generally been successful in weeding out the few frivolous suits 
238 See Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 193-226 
(1974); Lazarus, supra note 13, at 673-74; Sax, Some Thoughts, supra note 236, at 494; 
Comment, Wetlands Regulation: The "Taking" Problem and Private Property Interests, 12 
URB. L. ANN. 301, 309-10 (1976); see generally Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1241-42 (1967). 
239 See Thibodeau, supra note 24, at 1. 
240 MEPA commentators have been fairly unanimous on this point. See A. REITZE, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW 1-54 (1972); F SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK § 7.10 at 272 (1981); Abrams, supra note 62, at 118; Dimento, Overview, supra 
note 14, at 428-29 (1976); Sax & Conner, supra note 24, at 1007; Slone, supra note 26, at 273-
74. 
Nevertheless, there have been mixed indications regarding the reaction of the industrial 
and development communities to MEPA. One survey has indicated that industry has suffered 
no major dislocations as a result of MEPA or similar statutes. See Dimento, Overview, supra 
note 14, at 443 & n.160; see also Haynes, supra note 11, at 655-57, Sax & Dimento, supra 
note 93, at 12-13. But see Slone, supra note 26, at 297 & nn.168-69. 
Commentators credit a number of factors for the small number of MEPA suits brought: 
traditional legal cost factors, economic downturns limiting the amount of development activity, 
and lack of public awareness or publicity accorded to adverse MEP A opinions. See Abrams, 
supra note 62, at 119; Dimento, Overview, supra note 14, at 449-50; Haynes, supra note 11, 
at 593; Slone, supra note 26, at 273-74. For a discussion of factors inhibiting citizen suits 
under federal environmental statutes, see Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up 
the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 54-74 (1985). 
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brought under the Act.241 Furthermore, no serious effects on the 
administrative process have been observed. 242 Finally, courts do not 
seem to have wrestled unduly with the metaphysics of the "public 
trust. "243 
Despite the adverse judicial decisions discussed herein, commen-
tators and practitioners in Michigan have not lost their enthusiasm 
for MEP A. The law still serves as a valuable tool for citizen inter-
vention in public and private decisions affecting ecological values, 
and still helps concerned citizens and agencies force compromise 
solutions to complex environmental controversies. 244 
However, the approaches recently adopted in a number of cases 
involving MEP A and the laws modelled upon it could blunt the 
statutes' vitality in the years to come. MEPA, particularly, due to 
its status as a "harbinger of the environmental movement,"245 must 
retain the support of the judicial branch if its novel focus on alter-
natives is to be followed in other states. By giving the citizen a 
stronger voice in the planning and development of activities affecting 
his environmental rights, MEPA, MERA and CEPA have yielded 
new solutions to constantly-escalating resource preservation contro-
241 See Sax & Connor, supra note 24, at 1017-19 (discussion of Roberts v. Michigan). Roberts 
is reprinted in A. REITZE, supra note 240, at 1-56. Professor Abrams credits the lack of 
frivolous litigation to an intuitive awareness on the part of courts and litigants regarding the 
"typical elements of a plausible case." Abrams, supra note 62, at 132. 
242 F. SKILLERN, supra note 240, § 7.10, at 272. Professor Skillern also notes, however, that 
Michigan courts have rarely used the power MEPA gives them to rewrite agency pollution 
standards. [d. 
243 But see Stevens v. Creek, 121 Mich. App. 503, 328 N.W.2d 672 (1982). In Stevens, the 
appellees contended that MEPA did not apply, because the land in question was subject to no 
public trust or public right of use. The court of appeals, stressing the act's disjunctive language, 
held that MEP A applied whenever natural resources or the public trust was threatened. In 
separating the two concepts, it is not clear that the court acknowledged the presence of a 
public trust in even privately owned resources. Contra CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-15 
(1985) ("there is a public trust in the air, water, and other natural resources of the state of 
Connecticut .... "). 
244 F. SKILLERN, supra note 240, § 7.10 at 272; Sax & Dimento, supra note 93, at 9; Slone, 
supra note 26, at 297-98. See also Olson, supra note 73, at 185-86. 
245 Sax & Dimento, supra note 93, at 1. 
However, the impetus behind environmental legislation patterned after MEPA seems to 
have waned considerably, causing even some of MEPA's staunchest supporters to question 
whether such laws are likely to be enacted in the future. See Dimento, Western States, supra 
note 3, at 184-86. Organized opposition to such laws, and the perceived desirability of alter-
native methods of environmental control may make the passage of MEPA-based statutes 
unlikely in the years to come. For a discussion of some of the legal arguments and institutional 
roadblocks currently impeding the passage of environmental citizen suit laws, see id. at 181-
84. 
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versies of the modern age. If courts continue to emphasize private 
or public economic objectives over collective environmental goals by 
interpreting these statutes with heightened regard for the social 
utility of challenged conduct, to apply only in exceptional cases, or 
to work unconstitutional takings of private property, the fight for 
environmental quality will have lost an important legal weapon. 
